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Abstract 
 
Using micro-level data, we examine the effects of Russia’s 2001 flat rate income tax reform on 
consumption, income, and tax evasion.  We use the gap between household expenditures and 
reported earnings as a proxy for tax evasion with data from a household panel for 1998-2004.  
Utilizing difference-in-difference and regression-discontinuity-type approaches, we find that large 
and significant changes in tax evasion following the flat tax reform are associated with changes in 
voluntary compliance.  We rule out alternative explanations based on changes in tax enforcement 
effort, savings behavior, expenditures on durables, and others.  We also find that the productivity 
response of taxpayers to the flat tax reform is small relative to the tax evasion response.  Finally, we 
develop a feasible framework to assess the deadweight loss from personal income tax in the 
presence of tax evasion based on the consumption response to tax changes.  We show that because 
of the strong tax evasion response the efficiency gains from the Russian flat tax reform are at least 
30% smaller than the gains implied by conventional approaches.  
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1. Introduction 
Tax evasion is a pervasive worldwide phenomenon.  It is widely believed that high personal 
income tax rates are partially responsible for high levels of tax evasion everywhere, especially in 
emerging markets.  High personal income tax rates are also often associated with negative effects 
on economic activity.  This study offers a broadly applicable method to assess the impact of 
changes in personal income tax on the level of tax evasion and productivity by using consumption 
and income data from household surveys.1  The study also develops a framework to assess the 
welfare costs of distortionary personal income taxes in the presence of tax evasion based on the 
consumption response to tax changes.  We exploit unique features of the well known Russian flat 
rate tax reform of 2001 to identify the effect of changes in the personal income tax on tax evasion, 
productivity, and welfare.  Using a variety of statistical methods, robustness checks, and the 
richness of the data in the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS), we conclude: i) that 
the tax evasion in response to the tax change was large, but, ii) that the productivity response was 
relatively weak and, hence, iii) that the welfare gains from cutting tax rates were considerably 
smaller than was thought before.  
In January 2001, Russia introduced a fairly dramatic reform of its personal income tax when 
it became the first large economy to adopt a flat rate personal income tax.  The Tax Code of 2001 
replaced the previous conventional progressive rate structure with a flat tax rate of 13 percent.2  
Over the next year, the Russian economy grew at almost 5 percent in real terms, while revenues 
from the personal income tax increased by over 25 percent in real terms (Table 1).  Despite the fact 
that economic theory does not precisely predict the effect of reduced tax rates on the degree of tax 
                                                 
1 In our definition, the productivity response includes changes in labor supply, occupations, effort, location, and other 
margins of adjustment that change the amount of total resources available to households for consumption.  In contrast, 
the tax evasion response involves shifting resources from one account (‘non-reported income’) to another (‘reported 
income’) without affecting the amount of total resources available to households for consumption. 
2 Estonia, first, and then Latvia and Lithuania had introduced flat rate personal income taxes during the early 1990s.   
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evasion,3 advocates of the flat tax largely credit Russia’s flat tax reform with this dramatic turn in 
revenue performance.  Advocates also credit the flat tax with beneficial changes in real economic 
activity.  More recently, several other Eastern European countries (Serbia, Ukraine, Georgia, 
Romania, Slovakia, and Macedonia) have adopted flat rate income tax reforms.  At the latest count, 
more than 20 countries have implemented or are about to implement some form of flat rate income 
tax following, many believe, Russia’s steps (Sabirianova Peter et al. 2007).  Although after-reform 
data are not yet fully available for these countries, in some cases (for example, Slovakia) flat tax 
reform is again being credited with significant revenue turnarounds and the stimulation of economic 
activity.  More recently, several OECD countries have been giving serious consideration to the 
adoption of flat tax reforms.4 
Russia’s flat tax reform was quite revolutionary because it involved a large country and 
because it affected many people, not only the rich.  But beyond the excitement Russia’s flat tax 
reform has created, so far very little solid evidence has been provided on its impact on tax evasion 
or real economic activity.  As shown in Table 1, after a period with negative real growth and high 
inflation rates that culminated with the financial crisis of 1998, the Russian economy started a 
period of solid economic growth and more stable prices in 1999.  By the time the flat rate of income 
tax was introduced in the Tax Code of 2001, real GDP had grown by 9 percent in 2000 and 5 
percent in 2001.  At the same time, in the most striking performance, real collections from the 
personal income tax grew at close to 26 percent in 2001, the year of the reform, and continued to 
grow by 21 percent in 2002 and almost 12 percent in 2003; in posterior years the growth rate 
declined significantly.  This burst in collection performance for the new personal income tax can 
potentially be explained by the better performance of the real economy, by improved voluntary 
compliance from taxpayers, and/or by stricter enforcement of the tax system via higher penalties 
                                                 
3 For a discussion, see Andreoni, Erard and Feinstein (1998) and Alm (1999).  
4 See Owens (2007).  In addition, several policy makers praised the Russian flat tax reform.  For example, during a state 
visit of Russia’s President Putin to the U.S. in 2001, President George W. Bush said, "I am impressed by the fact that 
[Putin] has instituted tax reform -- a flat tax.  And as he pointed out to me, it is one of the lowest tax rates in Europe.  He 
and I share something in common:  We both proudly stand here as tax reformers."  
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and enforcement efforts by the tax authorities.  Although real income grew during 2001 and the 
years after, the figures in Table 1 suggest that something else may have been behind the significant 
increase in real collections from the personal income tax.  An explanation based on higher penalties 
for tax evasion is the least plausible of the other alternate causes because a significant feature of the 
new Russian Tax Code was that it generally reduced the draconian tax penalties that had been in 
force during the 1990s.5  Therefore, it would seem worthy to investigate the potential roles that 
improved voluntary compliance and better administration enforcement efforts may have played in 
the sharp increase in collections.   
Measuring the level of tax evasion is notoriously difficult, requiring programs of random 
intensive taxpayer audits such as the Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program (TCMP) 
conducted by the U.S. Internal Revenue Service (Slemrod 2007).  Most countries, including Russia, 
have not carried out this type of program.  In this paper, we use economic theory and micro data on 
income and household spending to detect the changes in tax evasion after the tax reform.  
Specifically, we estimate the difference between reported consumption and reported income, which 
we call the consumption-income gap.6  Since the reform only decreased marginal tax rates for some 
groups of people, we use the variation in the consumption-income gap across time and taxpayers to 
identify and estimate the tax evasion response. 
Our approach is distinct from previous studies that also used data on income or expenditure 
composition to study tax evasion.  This previous research typically uses a group of taxpayers who 
are known to comply (e.g., employees subject to withholding) as a benchmark to assess the true 
income for a group of taxpayers in question (e.g., self-employed).7  Given this dichotomy of tax 
                                                 
5 See Martinez-Vazquez, Rider, and Wallace (2008). 
6 Our approach to detect tax evasion is broadly related to the literature utilizing discrepancies between different data 
sources to study evasion, cheating, smuggling, and other unreported activities.  For example, Fisman and Wei (2004) 
use the difference between Chinese and Hong Kong customs data to assess the effect of duties on tax evasion.  In a 
similar spirit, Marion and Muehlegger (2008) use the observed changes in diesel sales in response to dyeing untaxed 
diesel to infer evasion of taxes on diesel for on-road purposes.   
7 For example, the IRS in the U.S. reports that for 2001 filed returns only 1 percent of wages and salaries were 
underreported, but that an estimated 57 percent of non-farm proprietor income was not reported (IRS 2006). 
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compliers and non-compliers, one can use the discrepancy between the two groups to approximate 
the level of tax evasion.  Thus, for example, Pissarides and Weber (1989) exploit differences in food 
consumption; Lyssiotou, Pashardes, and Stengos (2004)8 look at differences in the composition of 
consumption; and Feldman and Slemrod (2007) examine differences in charitable contributions to 
impute income hidden from taxes.  For Russia, we cannot use this “benchmark” approach because 
tax evasion was widespread, with employees quite likely practicing as much tax evasion as the self-
employed.  For example, employers and employees often have engaged in explicit and implicit 
agreements to conceal a part of wages to reduce the tax burden.  The modes of tax evasion have 
included employees receiving compensation in the form of envelopes with cash, purchase of life 
insurance policies and other fringe benefits, interest from bank deposits made by the employer, not 
reporting income from a second job, failure to consolidate incomes from different sources, and so 
on. 
When tax evasion is present in all groups, the approach based on total expenditures and total 
income is more appropriate.  Implicitly, this approach has been adopted by the Russian System of 
National Income and Product Accounts, in which disposable income is constructed as a sum of 
household aggregate expenditures and savings, and the difference between imputed disposable 
income and the officially reported income is included in income accounts as unobserved labor 
compensation.  In a similar vein, the first comprehensive study of the Russian flat tax by Ivanova, 
Keen and Klemm (2005) uses the ratio of total income to total expenditures as a proxy for 
compliance and finds a statistically significant increase in the income-to-expenditure ratio among 
high earners one year after the Russian tax reform.  However, largely due to methodological 
constraints and different focus, their study did not isolate the effect of tax changes on voluntary 
compliance from other confounding explanations for the increase in the income-to-expenditure ratio 
                                                 
8 Lyssiotou, Pashardes, and Stengos (2004) use the consumption demand approach in measuring tax evasion.  They 
observe that tax evasion influences the composition of consumption, and that one can impute true income by adjusting 
income to match consumption shares. 
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and concludes that “it remains unclear whether this [increase in compliance] was due to the 
parametric tax reform or to accompanying changes in enforcement” (p.398).  
Our methodology allows us to isolate the decline in tax evasion in Russia following the flat 
tax rate reform that was due to a change in voluntary compliance in response to the flat tax rate 
from other causes, including the potentially greater enforcement effort realized by the tax 
administration authorities.  Our approach is based on three pillars.  The first is the identification of 
the treatment group based on after-reform reported income.  The essential advantage of this 
identification strategy is that after the reform households facing the flat marginal tax rate should 
have no behavioral response to the pre-reform tax rate thresholds.  The second pillar is the theory-
driven specification of the consumption-income gap function that includes tax evasion 
determinants, life-cycle factors, consumption composition shifters as well as time-invariant 
unobservable household characteristics (and time-varying regional shocks in some specifications).  
The third pillar is the regression-discontinuity type estimation that provides a consistent estimate of 
the treatment effect at the point of discontinuity (the tax bracket threshold).  In this case, the 
treatment effect is less likely to be confounded with other factors because taxpayers just below and 
just above the threshold as applied to the post-reform income are likely to be very similar (e.g., they 
should have the same probability of being subjected to the tax audit). 
Together, these methods can effectively isolate the voluntary compliance response to tax 
changes from other factors such as increased enforcement effort by the tax administration, changes 
in saving behavior, credit market development, changes in the composition of consumption, 
supplementary revisions to the Tax Code, and so on.  We estimate a relatively large tax evasion 
response of households to changes in tax rates in the magnitude of 10-11% for the entire treatment 
group and at the point of discontinuity.  We also demonstrate that the response of the consumption-
income gap to changes in tax rates is insensitive to alternative definitions of income and 
consumption (including those with net savings, in-kind consumption, and purchases of durables) 
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and to various subsamples that eliminate households subject to deductions, different payroll rates, 
etc.    
In addition to estimating the tax evasion response, we also assess the effect of the tax reform 
on productivity by estimating the consumption response to tax rate changes for the whole treatment 
group and at the point of discontinuity.  Our consumption-based analysis of productivity gains from 
the reform has two important advantages.  First, in contrast to the labor supply response, the 
consumption response works like a sufficient statistic for many margins of adjustment including 
labor market participation, hours of work, efforts, location choice, and occupational mobility.  
Second, unlike the taxable income response, the consumption response is immune to changes in tax 
evasion as well as to income shifting activities in the sense that the consumption response correctly 
measures changes in resources available to households.  
 We find the productivity effect to be positive but small relative to the tax evasion effect (2% 
on average).  These findings are important for social welfare calculations because, as Chetty (2007) 
argues, welfare gains from tax cuts can depend on the ability of taxpayers to evade taxes, and one 
has to separate the productivity response from the evasion response to correctly compute 
deadweight losses from taxes.  If the (perceived) cost of tax evasion is mainly in being caught and 
fined rather than in the real cost of hiding incomes, the deadweight loss from income tax could be 
much smaller than implied by a typically large elasticity of (taxable) income with respect to the tax 
rate.  If the evasion response dominates the productivity response as in the Russian case, the 
efficiency gain from the tax reform would be smaller than implied by the income response.  We 
develop a novel framework to assess the deadweight loss from personal income tax in the presence 
of tax evasion.  The framework, which utilizes both consumption and income responses to tax 
changes, accommodates both real (resource) and penalty costs of tax evasion.  Using this 
framework, we show that adjustments for tax evasion can significantly alter the magnitude of 
deadweight losses from personal income taxes and the corresponding welfare gains from tax 
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reform.  We estimate that the deadweight losses adjusted for tax evasion are at least 30% smaller 
than the deadweight losses based on conventional approaches that utilize only the income response 
to tax changes. 
The results of Russia’s reforms are valuable for many other countries.  As we noted above, 
another 20 or so countries besides Russia have recently introduced flat rate tax reforms and several 
other countries are considering the adoption of this type of reform.  An important implication taken 
from the present analysis of Russia’s experience is that the adoption of a flat rate income tax can 
lead to significant reductions in tax evasion and increased tax revenues in countries where tax rates 
are high and tax evasion levels are significant.  But these revenues are likely to come from better 
reporting and increased compliance, and much less from changes in labor supply and increased 
economic activity.   
The paper also makes several methodological contributions to the empirical public finance 
literature.  The paper offers a general approach to estimating the extent of tax evasion in different 
countries provided there are available longitudinal household income-expenditure surveys and 
intermittent tax reforms with significant changes in tax burdens.  Although these conditions will not 
always be met, the list of countries where the methodology can be applied far exceeds that of 
countries that implement extensive random audit programs to examine the extent of tax evasion.  
Also the paper: (i) suggests a methodology for separating tax evasion and productivity responses to 
changes in tax rates; (ii) shows that the response of consumption to tax changes is the right 
approach to calculating deadweight losses; and (iii) contributes empirical evidence on the 
relationship between tax rates and tax evasion, which has not been clearly established in past cross-
sectional studies  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  In Section 2, we derive a tax evasion 
function using the difference in the log of consumption and income.  Next, in Section 3, we 
introduce our data and descriptive statistics.  In Section 4, we present the estimates of the tax 
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evasion function.  Sections 5 and 6 discuss methodological issues and provide the estimates of the 
flat tax effect using difference-in-difference and regression-discontinuity-type approaches.  In 
Section 7, we investigate the productivity effect of the flat tax and develop a framework to assess 
the deadweight loss from personal income taxes in the presence of tax evasion based on the 
consumption response to tax changes.  Finally, in Section 8, we draw some conclusions. 
2. Data and Variables 
We use the 1998, 2000-2004 rounds of the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey 
(RLMS), a household panel survey which is based on the first national probability sample drawn in 
the Russian Federation and administered by the University of North Carolina.9  This is a very rare 
household database with a sufficiently long panel before and after the flat tax reform.  The panel 
structure of the data is useful in implementing before and after analysis while controlling for 
constant unobservable household and local characteristics in estimations.  Having post-reform data 
for four consecutive years is particularly valuable for capturing the full extent of the response to tax 
rate changes since households may need some time to learn about implications of the reform, 
convince themselves that the reform is permanent, and make appropriate adjustments (see Johnson, 
Parker, and Souleles (2006) for a recent example of the dynamic response in the U.S.).  There were 
8,343 to 10,670 individuals who completed the adult (age 14 and over) questionnaire and 3,750 to 
4,718 households who completed the household questionnaire in each round.  These individuals and 
households reside in 32 oblasts (regions) and 7 federal districts of the Russian Federation.10   
The key variables in our analysis are household consumption and household reported 
income.  The household questionnaire contains detailed information on separate expenditure items 
                                                 
9 We do not use the 1994-1996 rounds because of high macroeconomic volatility during this period, with annual 
inflation reaching 214% in 1994, and apparent noise in respondents’ answers, especially, with regard to food items.  In 
addition, the early questionnaires did not include contractual earnings, which are the key variable for our analysis as 
well as several important expenditure items such as medicine, car repair, etc.  RLMS was not conducted in 1997 and 
1999.  
10 Russia has 89 regions and 7 federal districts.  The RLMS sample consists of the 38 randomly selected primary sample 
units (municipalities) that are representative of the whole country.  
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purchased in the last 30 days (unless indicated otherwise): more than 50 items of food at home and 
away from home, alcoholic and non-alcoholic beverages, and tobacco products purchased in the last 
7 days;11 expenses on clothing and footwear in the last 3 months; gasoline and other fuel expenses 
(3 subcategories); rents and utilities, and 15-20 subcategories of services (such as transportation, 
repair, health care services, education, entertainment, recreation, insurance, etc.).  These 
expenditure items are aggregated into monthly consumption of non-durable items (C1), which is our 
baseline measure of consumption.  The second consumption measure (C2) adds transfer payments 
in the last 30 days (6 subcategories include alimonies and various contributions in money and in 
kind to individuals outside the household unit).  Although transfer payments are not typically 
considered as part of consumption, households may derive extra utility from altruistic motives by 
transferring resources to relatives (Laitner and Juster 1996, Altonji, Hayashi and Kotlikoff 1997, 
Kopczuk and Lupton 2007).  In addition to non-durable consumption items, households also report 
durables purchased in the last 3 months (10 subcategories include major appliances, vehicles, 
furniture, entertainment equipment, etc.).  Combining one third of these durable purchases and C1 
gives us a third measure of monthly consumption (C3).  For each expenditure item, it is known 
whether or not a household purchased the item, as well as the amount of the purchase.12   
Total household income is the combined income of all household members after taxes from 
all jobs and other regular sources.  The labor income is reported by the reference person as after-tax 
payments received by all household members from all places of work in the form of money, goods, 
                                                 
11 Monthly expenditures on food are computed as the sum of weekly expenditures on individual food items multiplied 
by 30/7=4.286.  Since some food items are storable (flour, sugar, potatoes and vegetables) and expenditures on these 
goods tend to be seasonal (typically, in the fall), we use top coding for unreasonably high amounts of food purchases 
conditional on household structure and food prices.  The procedure of top coding of food items is described in 
Gorodnichenko, Sabirianova Peter and Stolyarov (2008). 
12 When a household purchased the item but did not report the amount of the purchase, the missing amounts are imputed 
by regressing the log of expenditure on the complete interaction between year dummies and federal district dummies, 
controlling for the size of the household, number of children (18 years old or younger), and number of elderly members 
(60+).  The procedure is described in Gorodnichenko, Sabirianova Peter, and Stolyarov (2008).  The subcategories with 
the largest number of missing values include utilities (2.12% of the sample), gasoline and motor oil (1.63%), 
transportation services (1.54%), and contributions to non-relatives (1.35%).  Missing values for other subcategories are 
trivial. 
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and services in the last 30 days.  Non-labor income includes pensions, stipends, unemployment 
benefits, rental income, interests and dividends, alimonies, and child care benefits.  Our base 
income measure includes regular portions of labor and non-labor income, as defined above (Y1).  
The second income measure (Y2) adds irregular receipts from the last 30 days that consist of lump-
sum payments from insurance, amounts received from the sales of material assets, and 11 
subcategories of contributions from persons outside the household unit, including contributions 
from relatives, friends, charity, international organizations, etc.  These irregular receipts are 
generally not included in the definition of income.13  Finally, since households may derive 
supplementary income from household production, we also calculate the third income measure (Y3) 
by adding Y1 and income from selling household-grown, mostly agricultural products.14  As with 
expenditures, missing income amounts for the subcategories of non-labor income, irregular receipts, 
and household production are imputed using the regression approach described in Gorodnichenko, 
Sabirianova Peter, and Stolyarov (2008).  Overall, imputations are minimal.  Labor income is not 
imputed.   
We compare per capita consumption and income levels between RLMS and official 
National Income and Products Accounts (NIPA) in Figure 1.  The RLMS measures of consumption 
and income are made comparable to the NIPA measures by using similar data definitions (see the 
notes to Figure 1).  Consumer expenditures in RLMS and NIPA are close during most of the sample 
period,15 but reported disposable income in RLMS is as much as 30 percent lower than the official 
                                                 
13 A large component of the irregular income is private transfers (typically from relatives).  Because these transfers are 
not taxed, taxpayers do not have strong incentives to conceal this source of income, and thus adding transfers does not 
affect tax evasion directly.  However, Y2 can help us rule out explanations based on intra-family transfers in cases 
where households have large consumption because they are supported by other households.  
14 Income from household production is calculated by multiplying the amount of sold agricultural products (33 
subcategories) and local price per unit of product (see Gorodnichenko, Sabirianova Peter and Stolyarov 2008 for 
details). 
15 The 1998 discrepancy can be explained by the fact that the RLMS had been conducted right after the August financial 
crisis while NIPA’s numbers were averaged over the year. 
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figures.  While NIPA consumption and income data are internally consistent,16 RLMS reported 
income is always below consumption throughout the whole period, although the gap has been 
declining in recent years.17  This gap cannot be attributed to dissaving because most households 
have negligible stocks of financial assets and dissaving in such scale could not have lasted for years. 
Thus, the difference between reported income and consumption should not be used as a 
measure of saving, as some of the previous studies have done (e.g., Guariglia and Kim 2003).  
Instead, we compute gross saving as the sum of purchases of stocks, bonds, and other securities, 
current cash savings, and money lent.  Figure 1 shows the gross saving rate of RLMS households 
and contrasts it with the saving rate in the Household Budget Survey (HBS), the official source of 
household income and expenditure statistics in Russia.  Both sources show similar low and stable 
saving rate of households (3-6%).  To check the importance of borrowing for the consumption-
income gap, we also calculate net savings as the difference between the net change in financial 
assets and the net change in liabilities.  The net change in financial assets includes purchases of 
stocks, bonds, and other securities in the last 30 days, plus current cash savings in the last 30 days, 
minus sales of stocks, bonds, and other securities in the last 30 days, minus the amount of spent 
savings, foreign currency and valuables in the last 30 days.  The net change in liabilities is 
computed as money borrowed in the last 30 days, minus money lent outside the household unit in 
the last 30 days, minus payments to creditors in the last 30 days, plus amounts received from 
debtors in the last 30 days.  The sum of C1 and net savings is defined as C4.     
                                                 
16 NIPA eliminates the discrepancy between reported income and consumption by construction.  Disposable income is 
constructed as the sum of household aggregate expenditures and savings, and the difference between imputed 
disposable income and the officially reported income is included in the income accounts as unobserved labor 
compensation.   
17 The design of the RLMS questionnaire makes it difficult for households to balance consumption expenditures with 
income: total consumption expenditures are never asked, questions on income and consumption are given in separate 
sections, and the questionnaire is filled out by the interviewer, not by an interviewee.  Thus, households do not observe 
the totals for itemized incomes and consumption expenditures simultaneously to be able to match them.  If households 
try to roughly match consumption to income, our estimates should be interpreted as a lower bound. 
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All monetary values at the household level are expressed in December 2002 prices and 
adjusted for regional cost-of-living differences by using the regional value of a fixed basket of 
goods and services.18   
The household-level data are supplemented by individual information on the head of the 
household, including employment participation, earnings, age, schooling, tenure, and characteristics 
of the primary employer such as formal organization, ownership, location, and firm size.  The head 
of the household is defined as the person with the largest income.  If more than one individual 
within a household have similar incomes, then the oldest person is defined as the head of the 
household.  In a few exceptional cases of multiple household members with the same age and 
income, the priority is given to the first person in the roster files.    
3.  Conceptual Framework: Derivation of Tax Evasion Function 
Our theoretical starting point is the permanent income hypothesis (PIH) which suggests that 
consumption equals permanent income.  Consequently, consumption contains important 
information about resources (income) available to households.  If consumption consistently deviates 
from reported income holding everything else constant, one may suspect that some part of the 
income is not reported.  In fact, tax authorities often use the discrepancy between income and 
expenditures to detect tax evasion.  Thus, the differential between consumption and income can 
inform us about whether and to what extent households evade taxes.  In the rest of this section, we 
formalize this idea and develop an econometric specification of the tax evasion function.   
Let *htY  be the (true) income received by household h at time t.  Households may choose to 
conceal a part of their income and report only *Rht ht htY Y= Γ , where htΓ  is the fraction of reported 
current income.  We can model htΓ  as a function of observable characteristics Sht that influence tax 
                                                 
18 To adjust for monthly inflation, we express all flow variables in December prices of the corresponding year by using 
a country average monthly CPI and the date of interview.  If the date of the interview is in the first half of the month, the 
previous month CPI is used.  If the date of interview is in the second half of month, the current month CPI is used.  
Then the annual (December to December) CPI for each 32 oblasts (regions) is applied to convert the flow variables into 
December 2002 prices. 
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compliance: ( ) exp( )ht ht htS S errorγΓ = Γ = − + .  In addition to job and worker characteristics, the 
vector Sht might also include various central and regional government policies, in particular, the 
2001 flat tax reform, which is our focus. 
Further, let’s assume that current household income *htY  is related to permanent income 
P
htY  
as * Pht ht htY Y= Η , where 1, 1,( ) exp( )ht ht htX X errorηΗ = Η = +  captures deviations of current income 
from permanent income due to life cycle factors 1,htX  such as age, schooling, employment 
participation, number of children, etc. and due to transitory shocks absorbed into the error term.  
Accounting for the life-cycle factors is necessary because the difference between permanent/life-
time income and current income exhibits strong life-cycle dynamics (e.g., Hubbard, Skinner, and 
Zeldes 1995, Gourinchas and Parker 2002, and Haider and Solon 2006). 
Since service flows of durable goods are often unknown, we should further assume that 
expenditures on non-durables Cht constitute a fraction of permanent income, that is, Pht ht htC Y= Θ .  
This fraction is fixed if the consumption aggregator for durables and non-durables has a Cobb-
Douglass form in the utility function.19  We allow the fraction Θ  to vary across households.  In 
particular, we let 1, 2,( ) exp( )ht ht htX X errorθΘ = Θ = + , where 2,htX  consists of the number of 
household members and number of children in order to account for economies of scale, while the 
number of elderly members, age, schooling, and marital status are included as taste shifters.  This 
list of variables is commonly used in empirical consumption functions (e.g., Blundell et al. 1994, 
Browning and Lusardi 1996).   
Given our assumptions, we obtain three important relationships: 
                                                 
19 We assume constant unitary income elasticity of consumption because we consider the total consumption of non-
durables goods.  The ratio of non-durables to income is fairly stable in macroeconomic data, which is consistent with 
the constant unitary elasticity.  Although Pissarides and Weber (1989) and several subsequent papers allow the income 
elasticity to be different from one, those studies deal with food consumption and other specific goods instead of total 
consumption.  We also note that even if the household survey had collected information on the value of durables, 
households have strong incentives to underreport consumption/ownership of durables because it is highly visible and 
indicative of true earnings. Hence, using that information to construct the service flow of durables and consequently 
total consumption would most likely underestimate the extent of tax evasion.  Our results hardly change when we add 
the recent purchases of durables to the consumption of non-durables, as will be shown below. 
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*ln ln ,Rht ht htY Y S errorγ− = − +  (1a) 
*
1,ln ln ,
P
ht ht htY Y X errorη− = +  (1b) 
2,ln ln .
P
ht ht htC Y X errorθ− = +  (1c) 
Even though *htY  and 
P
htY  are not observable, we can still estimate our parameter of interest 
γ  if we combine equations (1a-1c) into the observed consumption-income gap function (2).  Since 
vectors  1,htX  and 2,htX  are likely to overlap considerably, we let htX  be a union of 1,htX  and 2,htX  
to simplify notation and write our final specification as  
hthhtht
R
htht uXSYC εβγ +++=− lnln , (2) 
where γ shows the effect of Sht on tax evasion; uh is a time-invariant component of the error term 
that accounts for risk aversion, preferences, and other constant household and local characteristics 
affecting consumption and/or income, and εht is a random error term.20   
Following Pissarides and Weber (1989), Lyssiotou, Pashardes, and Stengos (2004), and 
others, we assume that the consumption of non-durables, which is our preferred measure of 
consumption, is correctly reported, and the income reported in the household survey is used for tax 
purposes.  If consumption of non-durables is under-reported, we underestimate the extent of the tax 
evasion.  Johnson and Moore (2005), among others, find that income reported in surveys is typically 
greater than income reported for tax purposes.  This pattern implies that we may again 
underestimate the extent of tax evasion.  
On the right-hand side of equation (2), we have two vectors of covariates S and X.  The 
vector S accounts for individual variation in tax evasion due to age, schooling, marital status, tenure, 
type of job (enterprise vs. self-employment), sector (private vs. public), and the firm size for the 
                                                 
20 The consumption-income gap function has a convenient semi-log functional form.  From the permanent income/life-
cycle theory of consumption, the consumption-income ratio should be equal to one and the log of this ratio is zero. 
Thus, we can interpret the coefficients in equation (3) as percentage deviations of the consumption-income ratio from 
the “steady state”.  Using the log-ratio also improves the statistical properties of our estimates as the consumption-
income ratio and the error in income underreporting (Alexander and Feinstein 1987) are highly skewed.  
 15
head of the household.  It also contains year dummies and a trend variable for the after-reform 
period.  Based on our earlier discussion, the vector X includes age, schooling, marital status, 
employment participation, number of household members, number of children, and number of 
elderly members.  Since some of the factors are present in both vectors (e.g., age, schooling, and 
marital status), we have to be cautious not to attribute the estimates solely to tax evasion.  In 
summary, if proper controls are included, the consumption-income gap function (2) becomes a 
useful tool for analysis of tax evasion. 
The permanent income hypothesis assumes that households have the ability to borrow and 
lend to smooth consumption.  This could be a strong assumption in the Russian context given that 
the saving rate and the stock of financial assets are very low, and one may be inclined to use the 
cash-on-hand as a chief determinant of consumption (instead of permanent income).21  In this case, 
the consumption-income gap function continues to be the relevant tool for studying tax evasion 
because constrained households should spend all available after-tax income on consumption 
(equation (1b) can be omitted in this case).  Therefore, violations of PIH are not likely to lead to any 
major distortions of our results in practice.  
4. Tax Evasion and Consumption-Income Gap 
In this section, we perform a series of estimations to verify that the consumption-income gap 
is an informative indicator of tax evasion behavior.  We do not have estimates of tax evasion from 
tax audits like the Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program (TCMP) in the U.S.  However, we 
know from studies based on the TCMP and similar programs in other countries that tax evasion is 
correlated with observable characteristics of taxpayers.  We can utilize this information to check 
whether our estimates of the consumption-income gap function are consistent with common tax 
evasion determinants.   
                                                 
21 We also note that the inability to borrow in formal credit markets can be mitigated by intra-family transfers.   
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We begin by reporting household fixed effect estimates of specification (2) for four 
combinations of income and consumption in Table 2.22  All four specifications show that the 
consumption-income gap is declining with age but not changing with schooling.23  Although we 
cannot interpret results on age, schooling, and marital status as factors of tax evasion, the sign of 
coefficients on age is consistent with other studies showing that the tax evasion is less likely among 
older (and risk-averse) workers (e.g., Clotfelter 1983, Andreoni, Erard, and Feinstein 1998, Slemrod 
and Yitzhaki 2002).  Married individuals are estimated to have a significantly smaller consumption-
income gap.24  The estimated positive effect of tenure might be due to accumulated additional 
experience regarding tax evasion opportunities while working at the same job.  The coefficient on 
working at an enterprise (as opposed to being self-employed) is negative and statistically 
significant, and it is consistent with previous U.S. studies showing that self-employed individuals 
tend to have higher noncompliance rates (Feinstein 1991, Feldman and Slemrod 2007, Slemrod 
2007).   
Firm size is another important determinant of tax evasion, but the previous literature 
provides mixed evidence.  The size effect is found to be positive in the U.S. firm-level studies 
(Slemrod 2007), but negative for Cameroon businesses (Gauthier and Gersovitz 1997) and positive 
or negative depending on whether an individual taxpayer in Jamaica works in the private or public 
sector (Alm, Bahl, and Murray 1990).  Our results show that the consumption-income gap is smaller 
for Russian workers employed in larger enterprises.  Since larger firms are subject to more 
extensive tax-compliance monitoring, workers are less likely to have loopholes in underreporting 
                                                 
22 We experimented with other definitions of consumption, such as the one that uses a non-itemized food expenditure 
variable or the one that includes net change in financial worth (net savings).  For these and other measures, we find 
similar results which we do not report.  None of our results change when we control for the number of earners.  
23 We experimented with polynomials in age as additional controls and found statistically insignificant concavity in age.  
24 This finding is opposite to what typically found in the U.S. literature (e.g., Feinstein 1991, Martinez-Vazquez and 
Rider 2005, Slemrod 2007).  The marriage tax penalty and complex married return are two common explanations for 
why married individuals in the U.S. are more likely to evade.  However, the Russian tax law does not allow for separate 
tax filing of married people, and the marriage tax penalty does not exist. 
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their incomes.  Larger firms also find it harder to implement tax evasion schemes with a variety of 
workers.25   
We also find that the gap is largest for workers in the state sector, which is in line with the 
finding by Gorodnichenko and Sabirianova Peter (2007a), who show that a greater consumption-
income gap in the public sector in Ukraine reflects widespread corruption and bribery of public 
sector employees.  Overall, estimated coefficients on control variables are broadly consistent with 
the results reported in evasion studies based on tax audits.   
One may expect that households are more likely to evade in the local jurisdictions where 
people are skeptical about whether the majority of the population pays taxes.  In 1998 and 2002 
(coincidentally before and after the tax reform), the RLMS collected information on attitudes and 
perceptions about taxes.  We construct a district-level measure for the share of individuals who 
believe that most people don’t pay taxes or pay taxes on less than half of their income and use it as 
an additional regressor in the consumption-income gap function.  We find an overwhelmingly 
strong relationship between the consumption-income gap and average tax perceptions.26  In the 
districts where people tend to believe that most people do not pay taxes, households indeed have a 
larger consumption-income gap (see Table 3).  Thus, a consumption-income gap is likely to provide 
meaningful information about tax evasion at the household level. 
Overall, the estimates of the consumption-income gap function are consistent with a tax 
evasion story and its common determinants.  Obviously, tax evasion is a concealed act and therefore 
without audit data we cannot test directly whether the consumption-income gap truly captures the 
extent of latent tax evasion.  However, we provide compelling, indirect evidence to support our 
claim that the consumption-income gap is related to tax evasion. 
                                                 
25 The negative tax evasion effect of the firm size could also be linked to the employer size-wage premium literature 
(Brown and Medoff 1989).  Employees of large firms earning a wage premium will have weaker incentives to seek 
additional employment in the shadow economy. 
26 Alm, Martinez-Vazquez, and Torgler (2006) discuss the influence of these perceptions on taxpayers’ tax morale in 
Russia.  
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5. Tax Evasion Function:  Difference-in-Difference Approach 
5.1. Identifying the Effect of Flat Tax Reform 
Apart from confirming our intuition that the consumption-income gap is informative about 
tax evasion, Table 2 contains another remarkable result:  after being constant prior to 2001, the 
consumption-income gap started to continuously decline over time.  Table 2, Panel B reports a large 
and statistically significant coefficient on the after-reform trend variable indicating an average 6-7% 
decline in the consumption-income gap per year from 2001 to 2004.  The timing of the decline 
coincides with the Russian flat income tax reform and cannot be explained by changes in the saving 
rate which was stable for RLMS households during the period of our analysis.   
However, we cannot attribute the decline in the consumption-income gap solely to the flat 
tax reform because other events occurred at the same time.  For example, the credit market boom in 
the 2000s may also have reduced the consumption-income gap by providing incentives to report 
income in order to obtain a housing mortgage or other credit lines (Gorodnichenko and Sabirianova, 
2007b).  The 2001 tax reform by itself was comprehensive and was not limited to the changes in the 
personal income tax rates (Ivanova, Keen, and Klemm 2005).  Among the most significant tax code 
changes are i) the replacement of separate contributions to four social funds by the unified social tax 
paid by employers at the overall reduced rate, ii) abolished rules for multiple job holders to submit 
tax declarations, iii) a considerably higher 35% rate for income received from gambling, prizes, 
voluntary insurance contributions and excessive interest in attempt to combat various schemes of 
tax avoidance, and iv) a new system of tax deductions providing incentives to declare income 
(Russian Tax Code 2000, see also Appendix 1 for the summary of key changes).27   
In principle, the on-going reforms of tax administration might also have contributed to better 
income reporting.  Available descriptive statistics, however, show ambiguous changes in the work 
of the tax administration.  Using the Federal Tax Department archive, we have assembled time-
                                                 
27 Appendix 1 shows that many of these changes were irrelevant for a vast majority of taxpayers.  At the same time, the 
cornerstone elements of the personal income tax system such as withholding of taxes by employers did not change.   
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series information on tax audits and charges for tax law violations and reported these data in Table 
4.  Some measures favor the tax enforcement argument.  For example, both the ratio of received to 
accrued additional tax payments due to tax audits and the number of blocked bank accounts for tax 
related violations did increase after 2000.  At the same time, the number of on-site tax audits, total 
amount of charges, and the number of managers and entrepreneurs charged for breaching tax law 
have declined considerably after year 2000, which could be due, in part, to less tax evasion caused 
by the tax reform.  If the tax enforcement argument is valid, then it could also explain some of the 
decline in the consumption-income gap after 2000.   
As a first step in separating the tax evasion effect of reduced marginal rates from other 
factors, we use the difference-in-difference approach considering those who are affected by the flat 
tax reform (higher tax brackets) as a treatment group while those who are not affected (lower tax 
brackets) as a control group.  In particular, we estimate the following specification: 
ln ln ( )R treat treatht ht ht ht ht ht p p h htC Y S X d d D D uγ β μ α ψ ε− = + + + × + + + , (3) 
where 1( )
treat
ht ht htd I τ τ −= <  is a dummy variable indicating if the head of the household is in the 
treatment group (i.e., the group that experiences a decline in marginal tax rates conditional on *htY ) 
and Dp is a dummy variable for the post-reform period 2001-2004.   
The difference-in-difference approach is a very attractive tool as it controls for non-tax 
factors that simultaneously affect control and treatment groups.  The key element of equation (3) is 
the specification of the treatment and control groups which we discuss in the next subsection. 
5.2. Treatment and Control Groups 
Since the pre-reform marginal tax rates are correlated with the pre-reform level of current 
income, there is a potential source of endogeneity in equation (3) as the dummy variable treathtd  can 
be correlated with the error term εht.  For example, households can endogenously fall into the 
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treatment group due to their choice of income and other behavioral responses.28  This endogeneity 
problem is particularly acute when we use pre-reform reported incomes to classify taxpayers into 
treatment and control groups in the presence of tax evasion.  
To understand the source of the biases, we re-write equation (3) in first differences, consider 
only two periods t–1 and t (before and after the reform), and drop the subscript h to simplify 
exposition: 
( )1ln ln Rt t t t t t tC Y S X Iγ β α τ τ ε−Δ − Δ = Δ + Δ + < + Δ , (4) 
where tτ  is the flat tax rate in year t that is independent of income and 1tτ −  is the pre-reform 
marginal tax rate as an increasing step function of current (reported and hidden) income *Y .  The 
relevant treatment group I (.) consists of households experiencing a decline in the rate that they face 
(not the rate they decide to pay), defined on the basis of their total after-reform income that is 
* *
1( ) ( ) 0t t t tY Yτ τ− − > .  If the flat tax reform has reduced tax evasion, then α  should be negative, 
ceteris paribus.   
Because *tY  is not observable, suppose we use the pre-reform reported income to identify 
treatment and control groups. In this case, 
*
1 1 1 1 1
* * * * *
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
  0 0
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
          ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
R R R
t t t t t t t t
R
t t t t t t t t t t t t
true treatment productivity bias tax evasion bias
Y Y Y Y
Y Y Y Y Y Y
τ τ τ τ
τ τ τ τ τ τ
− − − − −
− − − − − − − −
≥ ≥
− = −
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= − − − − −⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦144424443 144424443 14442 3
( 1)
,
bias t−
444
1444444442444444443
 (5) 
where the first equality follows from the flat tax in the post-reform period.  Classification into 
treatment and control groups based on observed income is correct only when 1 1 1( ) ( )
R R
t t t tY Yτ τ− − −−  has 
the same sign as * *1( ) ( )t t t tY Yτ τ− − .  However, as equation (5) shows, the treatment group based on 
pre-reform reported income excludes wage earners that increase productivity and pass the threshold 
                                                 
28 See Triest (1998), Moffitt and Wilhelm (2000), and Auten and Carroll (1999) for exposition and a survey of the 
endogeneity problem as applied to labor supply and earnings responses without tax evasion.   
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(i.e., * *1 1 1( ) ( ) 0t t t tY Yτ τ− − −− ≥ ).  In addition, the treatment group also excludes households whose 
current income is in the upper brackets while the reported income is in the lower bracket (i.e., 
*
1 1 1 1( ) ( ) 0
R
t t t tY Yτ τ− − − −− ≥ ).  These are the households who are most likely to be “treated” by the 
reduced tax rate.  In other words, assignment into control group is affected by behavioral responses 
to tax changes.  Since the response of the control group is contaminated with the response of the 
treated group, the difference between control and treatment groups constructed on the basis of pre-
reform income is going to be smaller.  As a result, such misspecification will produce an upward 
bias in the estimate of α, implying that the effect of the flat tax reform on tax evasion is less likely 
to be found.29   
Now suppose we use the post-reform reported income to identify treatment and control 
groups.  One can interpret this approach as running the reform backwards from flat tax to a 
progressive tax scale.  Under the flat tax, all taxpayers face the same marginal tax rate irrespective 
of income; therefore, the assignment into the treatment and control groups is not affected by 
behavioral responses to differential tax rates.  In this case, 
*
1 1
* * *
1 1 1
 ( )   0
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
           ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ,          
R R R
t t t t t t t t
R
t t t t t t t t
true treatment bias t tax evasion bias
Y Y Y Y
Y Y Y Y
τ τ τ τ
τ τ τ τ
− −
− − −
= ≥
− = −
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= − − −⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦144424443 144424443
 (6) 
where the first equality again follows from the flat tax.  Note that if we assume that post-reform 
income is fully revealed (i.e., *Rt tY Y= ), then using post-reform income to identify the treatment 
effect (and treatment/control groups) yields unbiased estimates.  One can show that  
                                                 
29 To understand the sign of the bias, consider the following hypothetical case. Suppose there is an individual who 
receives 60,000 rubles before and after the reform (there is no productivity effect), and the reform reduces the marginal 
tax rate for people with more than 50,000 rubles in annual income.  Before the reform, the individual evades taxes and 
reports only 40,000 rubles in earnings.  After the reform, he reports 60,000 rubles.  Also, assume that the genuine 
response of the control group is zero, that is, actual and reported income do not increase for this group because they 
continue to face the same tax rate.  If the pre-reform reported income is used to identify the treatment group, then an 
individual would fall into the control group.  In this case, the response of the control group would be large because 
taxpayers choose to underreport their income before the reform.  It follows that holding everything else constant, the 
estimated treatment effect would be small because the response of the control group is large. 
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1 1 1( 1) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0
R R
t t t tbias t bias t Y Yτ τ− − −− − = − > , and hence the overall bias in defining the treatment 
group is smaller when we use the post-reform income.  Furthermore there should be fewer people 
affected by the tax evasion bias in year t because there are no longer incentives for households to 
cluster just below the threshold, and therefore there would be fewer people whose true current 
income is above the threshold while their reported income is just below the threshold (see Section 
6).  At the same time, because taxpayers can conceal some income even when the tax schedule is 
flat and hence some misclassification of the treatment group taxpayers in the control group is 
inevitable, we underestimate the effect of the tax reform. 
In summary, the flat tax reform itself provides a unique identification opportunity.  Since all 
people face the same marginal tax rate, the flat rate cannot be correlated with the after-reform 
reported income.  By applying the pre-reform rates to the post-reform income (or counterfactual 
rates), we can avoid the problem of reverse causality and provide a lower bound on the effect of 
reduced tax rates on tax evasion. 
To understand another potential source of endogeneity, recall that εht is the composite error 
term that originates in the three equations - 1a, 1b, and 1c.  The second equation (1b) contains a 
transitory error component that might be correlated with the marginal tax rate.  Unusually high 
income in one period is not generally consumed immediately.  As a result, large transitory 
movements in current income can generate a negative serial correlation in ( ln ln Pht htY Y
∗ − ), which can 
lead to a negative correlation between ( ln ln Pht htY Y
∗ − ) and pre-reform marginal tax rates if the rates 
are positively associated with the pre-reform income (so called “reversion to the mean” problem, 
see Moffitt and Wilhelm (2000)).  We should note, however, that a vast majority of households in 
the RLMS are liquidity constrained (only a tiny fraction of households report positive savings), and 
thus transitory income is likely to be consumed at the time it occurs.  Fortunately, in addition to 
actually received earnings, the RLMS provides information on contractual earnings that we can use 
to create treatment and control groups.  Contractual earnings have a much smaller transitory 
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component than the earnings actually received last month, and therefore they are less vulnerable to 
“the reversion to the mean” problem.30  To further minimize the adverse effects of transitory shocks, 
we follow Gruber and Saez (2000) and use the 4-year average of contractual earnings in the post-
reform period to construct treatment and control groups.  
In light of the discussion in this subsection, we define the treatment group as households 
whose heads earned more than 3,625 rubles (net of tax and after a 1% contribution to the pension 
fund) per month from all reported jobs at least once or on average after the tax reform.  This amount 
is equivalent to 50,000 rubles of gross annual earnings - an upper threshold for the 12% bracket 
under the 2000 annual budget law.  With a 1% contribution to the pension fund, the control group 
faces the same 13% marginal tax rate before and after the reform.  Thus, the design of the Russian 
reform not only offers a unique solution to the endogeneity of marginal tax rates by making the tax 
schedule flat, but also provides a ‘clean’ control group by keeping the same marginal tax rate for the 
lowest tax bracket.  We also note that the definition of the treatment group is not affected by 
standard tax deductions, which cannot be claimed by individuals earning more than 20,000 rubles 
per year (Russian Tax Code 2000). 
We report selected statistics describing the treatment and control groups in Appendix Table 
A1.  In short, households in the treatment group, which comprises of about 35% of all households, 
are larger and have more children, and the heads of those households are younger, more educated, 
and more likely to be married and employed than households in the control group.  Working heads 
of households in the treatment group also have less experience with the same employer and tend to 
work in the private sector and larger firms.  
                                                 
30 Contractual earnings are defined as the average monthly earnings after taxes over the last 12 months that the 
employee is supposed to receive regardless of whether or not it was paid on time.  Thus, contractual earnings also help 
to deal with the problem of irregularity of payments and wage arrears. The coefficient α might be negative if the reform 
period coincided with a smaller volatility in actual earnings (wage arrears, which were quite prevalent in the earlier 
years of the transition, started to fall after 1998).   
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5.3. Estimates of the Tax Evasion Response 
Table 5 reports the estimates of equation (3), with the treatment group defined on the basis 
of post-reform actual earnings received last month.  We find a large and significant decline in the 
consumption-income gap for the treatment group after 2000.  The estimate of α  is in the range 
between −0.11 and −0.09, suggesting that income grew by approximately 9−11% more than 
consumption, ceteris paribus.  Figure 2 illustrates a clear structural break in the consumption-
income gap dynamics in 2001 for both groups and a more pronounced decline for the treatment 
group.  The fact that the consumption-income gap decreases for the control group shows the 
importance of other factors discussed in subsection 5.1. 
Table 6 shows the estimates of α from several alternative specifications of the treatment 
group that use contractual earnings.  The estimates of α based on contractual earnings are negative 
and statistically significant, but they are slightly smaller in magnitude than the estimates based on 
the actual earnings received in the last month.  As follows from our earlier discussion of the 
reversion to the mean problem, the measures of earnings that contain a large transitory component 
tend to overstate in absolute terms the effect of the treatment on the consumption-income gap.  This 
is exactly what we find when we compare the estimates based on these two measures of earnings. 
We also restrict the sample to the households whose head’s implied gross annual earnings 
are between 20,000 and 100,000 rubles and apply the above definition of the treatment group to the 
restricted sample.  We use the restricted sample to remove the influence of standard deductions and 
eliminate the differential effect of the regressive unified social tax paid by employers (see Appendix 
1).  For each worker in the restricted sample, employers should pay the same 35.6% rate of the 
unified social tax after 2000.  Another benefit of the restricted sample is that the treatment group 
would have faced the same 20% rate if the pre-reform tax scale had remained after 2000 (the next 
30% bracket begins with 150,000 rubles).  As a robustness check, we excluded households with 
recent purchases of real estate and sizeable education expenses in order to avoid the potential 
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contamination of treatment and control groups due to the housing and social deductions described in 
Appendix 1.  In another robustness check, we excluded households with the recent purchases of real 
estate, vehicles, and stocks that title organizations are required to report to tax authorities. 
According to the earlier Russian tax law, tax brackets were not automatically adjusted for 
inflation, and thus, an increase in nominal wages could push taxpayers into higher tax brackets 
(“bracket creep” effect).  To assess the consequences of inflation adjustment, we apply the same 
criteria of the restricted sample to the earnings adjusted for inflation in December 2000 prices.  The 
treatment group is also defined after deflating the post-reform income to December 2000 prices.  
Finally, we add interactions between district dummies (at the county level) and year dummies to 
control for changes in regional characteristics such as the degree of credit market development, tax 
enforcement, and other time-varying regional factors.  We also allow individual and firm 
characteristics to have different effects before and after the reform.   
Regardless of modifications in specifications, samples, and definitions of income and 
consumption, the magnitudes of α coefficients are large and vary from –0.126 to –0.091 for 
monthly contractual earnings.31  Using the 4-year average of post-reform contractual earnings gives 
similar estimates.  Even when we replace the dummy variable for the post-reform period by the 
post-reform time trend, we obtain a large and statistically significant decline in the consumption-
income gap for the treatment group over time.  The estimates vary from –0.044 to –0.031.  In 
summary, we find that the households experiencing a decrease in the marginal tax rate have a 
greater reduction in the consumption-income gap.  
To verify that our results make economic sense, we also test if a decline in the consumption-
income gap is larger for individuals who are more likely to switch to tax compliance after the tax 
reform.  Only individuals with potentially legitimate labor incomes can reveal their true earnings.  
                                                 
31 We do not adjust our estimates for changes in the volatility of the error term because the variability in both 
consumption and income was slowly decreasing over time.  See Gorodnichenko, Sabirianova Peter and Stolyarov 
(2008) for more details.  
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For example, it is unlikely that employees in the public sector will disclose the portion of their 
income that originates from bribes and other forms of corruption, no matter how low tax rates are.  
At the same time, the majority of employees in the private sector as well as the self-employed can 
report their earnings since there is often nothing criminal in their labor market activity.  Hence, the 
consumption-income gap should decrease more strongly for the private sector workers than for 
employees in the public sector.  
In addition, Russian private firms have greater incentives to compensate skilled workers 
who earn greater wages in ways that reduce their wages reported for tax purposes.  After the reform 
the tax pressure is smaller, and hence the consumption-income gap should decline more for skilled 
than unskilled workers.  To test these two predictions, we modify the baseline specification (3) with 
additional interaction terms.  We report results in Table 7.  Consistent with theoretical predictions, 
the decline in the consumption-income gap is largest for private sector employees and for white 
collar workers within the private sector. 
Finally, we extend our baseline estimates of the consumption-income gap dynamics by 
accounting for changes in saving, expenditures on durables, and home production.32  First, we note 
that growth of durable purchases and a decline in production of home-grown food should increase 
the consumption-income gap, not decrease it.  Only a reduction in net saving will be consistent with 
the declining gap.  To examine the importance of these factors for our treatment effect estimates, we 
use alternative definitions of income and consumption that include components such as purchases of 
durable goods (C3), net savings (C4), and net income from home production (Y3).  These 
alternative measures of consumption and income yield estimates of the treatment effect (Table A2) 
similar to what we observe for our baseline definitions of income and consumption.  We also do not 
find a differential response in the saving rate, share of expenditures on durables, or share of income 
                                                 
32 Because net savings and durable purchases are highly volatile and irregular, we use these components only in 
supplementary (not primary) specifications.  Unfortunately, our data do not allow us to calculate the service flow of 
durables, which is the appropriate measure of durable consumption.   
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from home production for treatment and control groups between 1998-2000 and 2001-2004.  As a 
result, our treatment effect estimates remain largely unaffected by alternative specifications.   
6. Tax Evasion Function:  Examining the Response around the Threshold   
The DID approach assumes that the treatment impacts subjects uniformly, while in practice 
the strength of the treatment effect may be heterogeneous.  For example, the response of upper-
income households to changes in marginal tax rates can be different from the response of middle-
income households.  It is also possible that subjects are heterogeneous in ways that are difficult to 
control for due to unknown specification of functional forms, unobservables, etc.  The DID 
estimates might be contaminated by the differential evasion response of treatment and control 
groups to the various shocks and policy changes that coincided with the introduction of the flat tax 
such as tax administration reform.  Even though we control for the local differences in tax 
enforcement via interacting district and year dummies, it is still possible that the negative α might 
be attributed in part to collection efforts if tax enforcement focuses primarily on those households 
who are more likely to be in the treatment group (i.e., high earners).      
Discontinuity of marginal tax rates at the known threshold values of income provides an 
opportunity to use the regression discontinuity (RD) design to assess and validate our results from 
the difference-in-difference approach.  Under certain, relatively mild assumptions this alternative 
approach can address the issues we discuss above, and provide a consistent estimate of the 
treatment effect at the point of discontinuity (threshold income).  Since subjects just below and just 
above the threshold as applied to the post-reform income are likely to be similar (e.g., they should 
have the same probability of being subjected to the tax audit or the same propensity to consume 
durables), the treatment effect is less likely to be confounded with other factors.  When the subjects 
are drawn from the same part of the income distribution, and they are minimally different along the 
dimension that determines whether a subject is treated or not, then one can consider the assignment 
of treatment as if it is random.  
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We do not have a sufficient number of observations to implement RD in its classical form, 
however we can use the RD intuition and apply weights to the DID regression, with weights as a 
decreasing function of the distance from the threshold.  Specifically, we estimate parameters by 
minimizing  
{ }21 ln ln ( )N R treat treathp ht ht ht ht ht ht p p hh C Y S X d d D D uω γ β μ α ψ= − − − − − × − −∑ , (7) 
where hpω  is a fixed household-specific weight calculated on the post-reform income.  For any year 
t in the post-reform period p, the weight is calculated as 
# #ln ln ln ln
1
( ) ( )
R R
ht t st t
NY Y Y Y
b bs
K K− −=∑ , where K(.) is 
the Gaussian kernel, #tY  is the threshold income at which marginal tax rate changes, and b is the 
optimal “plug-in” bandwidth for the Gaussian kernel.  The weight is a function of the distance 
between the individual post-reform income and the pre-reform threshold value with higher weights 
given to the observations that are closer to the threshold.  We refer to equation (7) as the weighted 
difference-in-difference (WDID) estimator.  
Imbens and Lemieux (2007) suggest that this approach to estimating RD or RD-type 
treatment effects has a number of advantages.  First, although we put a small weight on 
observations distant from the threshold, we can use more information contained in the sample.33  
Second, estimation and inference are straightforward since one can use the standard method of 
weighted least squares.  Third, we can easily control for other factors to further ensure that just-
below and just-above samples are balanced along dimensions other than income.  Thus, weighed 
DID serves our purposes well since it has desirable statistical properties and preserves RD intuition.  
Again, for the same reasons discussed in Section 5, we use the post-reform income in 
identifying the treatment group and calculating the weights.  It is especially important for the RD-
type estimates, which are based on the assumption that the running variable (income) should not 
have jumps at points where a marginal tax rate changes.  In other words, there is no behavioral 
                                                 
33 Given an optimal bandwidth, taxpayers with income 43% below or above the threshold gross income of 50,000 rubles 
receive a weight less than 0.01.  
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response to the threshold.  This is not the case with the pre-reform income.  Figure 3 reveals that 
reported contractual earnings are clustered just below the threshold value (vertical line) in the year 
2000, but not in 2001.34  This clustering prior to the reform manifests a behavioral response to the 
discontinuity in the marginal tax rates.  For example, households may choose to earn more income 
(above the threshold) but report less just to be located at the point where their reported income is 
taxed at the minimum rate.  Clearly, we cannot use RD-type estimation when the treatment and 
control groups are defined on the basis of pre-reform income.  In contrast, using the post-reform 
income satisfies the RD assumptions as the density of reported income exhibits no lumping around 
the threshold.    
We estimate equation (7) and report results in Table 8.35  Generally, the WDID estimates of 
|α| are slightly larger than the DID estimates, although the difference between the estimates is not 
statistically significant.  Factors that could have pushed WDID estimates up or down relative to 
DID estimates approximately cancel out.  On the one hand, an estimate of |α| is likely be smaller in 
WDID than in DID if the households that are further away from the threshold (e.g., upper-income 
taxpayers experiencing the largest drop in the marginal tax rate) are more sensitive to changes in the 
marginal tax rate.  On the other hand, an estimate of |α| should be bigger in WDID if upper-income 
households respond less strongly than households closer to the threshold.  For example, households 
with high incomes may continue to find it imprudent to report all income as the risk of 
expropriation by the government or criminals could be so significant that it outweighs the benefits 
                                                 
34 Respondents tend to report rounded figures for their incomes, and this can explain spikes in histograms. 
35 We perform a number of specification checks to verify that assumptions underlying RD-type estimation are satisfied.  
The running variable (post-reform income) does not exhibit jumps at points where marginal tax rate changes.  The 
density of post-reform income is continuous in the relevant range.  The estimated effect is fairly insensitive to the 
choice of bandwidth.  The estimate of the effect somewhat decreases in absolute value as we shrink the bandwidth.  We 
find little evidence that the consumption-income gap has jumps at the levels of income not associated with changes in 
marginal tax rates (that is, we do not observe changes in the consumption-income gap at points of income that are not 
associated with changes in the marginal tax rates).  We cannot exploit another discontinuity at the income of 150,000 
rubles per year when the marginal tax rate changes from 21% to 31% because we have a small number of households in 
the top bracket.  
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of switching to tax compliance.  The net effect of these forces is roughly zero as WDID and DID 
estimates are close to each other.  
Similar to the DID estimates, the WDID estimates based on contractual earnings are 
somewhat smaller than the estimates based on earnings actually received in the last month.  Overall, 
the WDID estimates strongly support our earlier finding that the consumption-income gap fell for 
the treatment group after 2000.36  
7. Welfare Analysis 
Our findings so far indicate a positive effect of the Russian flat tax reform on income 
reporting relative to consumption.  The next question we would like to raise is whether the reform 
had any productivity effect in the economy.37  In the presence of tax evasion we may be unable to 
answer this question by simply estimating the earnings or earnings growth functions – a common 
tool for measuring the productivity response of numerous tax reforms in developed countries (e.g., 
Feldstein 1995, Aarbu and Thoresen 2001).  An observed increase in earnings could be due to an 
actual increase in labor productivity as well as due to better reporting and compliance.  In this 
section, we are going to argue that one needs to look at the consumption side to separate these two 
effects.   
Given the permanent income hypothesis, changes in consumption should reflect changes in 
permanent income and hence permanent productivity.  After controlling for the windfall gains due 
to lower taxes, the response of consumption to tax changes can capture to what extent people 
choose to increase their income by supplying more labor services.  This would be a genuine effect 
of the tax reform on the real side of the economy which is a relevant variable for welfare 
calculations.  In contrast, changes in reported income consist of productivity and tax evasion effects.  
                                                 
36 To account for the possibility of taxpayer misclassification into treatment and control groups at the cutoff point, we 
also experimented with excluding taxpayers with incomes within one percent deviation from the threshold. In these 
experiments, the WDID estimates are very similar to our baseline estimates and hence not reported.  
37 The productivity response to tax rates is not limited to changes in measurable hours of work but also includes changes 
in effort, job reallocation, occupational mobility, etc. (Feldstein 1995). 
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As Chetty (2007) argues, the latter effect can be irrelevant for welfare calculations since shifting 
resources across agents in the economy does not affect social welfare as long as this shifting does 
not alter the size of the ‘pie’ available to all agents.38  
7.1. Theoretical Framework 
To formalize these ideas, we follow Chetty (2007) and assume that workers maximize their 
utility, 
( , , ) ( )
. . (1 )( ) ( , ) ( )
u c l e c l
s t c t wl e e z e t g e
ψ= −
= − − + − −   
where c is consumption, w is wages, l is labor supply, e is the amount of tax evasion, t is tax rate, 
( )lψ  is disutility of labor, ( , ) ( )( )z e t p e et F= +  is the cost of being caught and fined, ( )p e  is the 
probability of being caught and fined, F  is the fixed penalty, and ( )g e  is the real (resource) cost of 
tax evasion.  The corresponding first order conditions are (1 ) ( ) 0t w lψ ′− − =  and 
( ) ( , ) 0et g e z e t′ ′− − = . 
The social welfare function is given by ( , , ) ( , ) ( )W u c l e z e t t wl e= + + − = ( ) ( )wl g e lψ− − .  
Note that ( , )z e t  is a pure transfer and therefore is irrelevant for social welfare.  The marginal 
change in welfare in response to the tax change is simply  
       (1 ) ,
W wl g e l
t t e t l t
wl g e l wl g et w t
t e t t t e t
ψ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂= − −∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂= − − − = −∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
 (8) 
where the second equality follows from the first-order condition of utility maximization with 
respect to labor supply.  Consequently, the relative welfare losses due to income taxes can be 
obtained as    
                                                 
38 Slemrod (1992) and others emphasize that the real response reflects how the tax system affects productive 
opportunities available to firms and individuals, while tax avoidance such as  income shifting across time, accounts, 
branches, etc. does not influence the size of the ‘pie’ available to the society.  In this respect tax avoidance is very 
similar to tax evasion.  
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1 ( ) ( ) EY
W t wl e e t eg e g e
wl t wl t twl t e twl
∂ ∂ ∂′ ′= − =∈ − ∈∂ ∂ ∂ . (9) 
Equation (9) highlights the three crucial pieces needed for welfare calculations: i) the elasticity of 
tax evasion to tax rates E∈ ; ii) the marginal resource cost of tax evasion ( )g e′ ; and iii) the elasticity 
of total earned income to tax rates *Y∈ .   
The first piece, the elasticity of the evasion response to changes in tax rates E∈ , is measured 
by the response of the consumption-income gap to changes in tax rates.  From our empirical 
estimates, we know that 0E∈ ≥ .  From the first order condition for tax evasion, we have an upper 
bound on the second piece, the marginal resource cost of tax evasion, ( ) ( , )eg e t z e t t′ ′= − ≤ , 
provided that ( , ) 0ez e t′ > .  This implies that welfare losses due to income taxes should be between 
*
e
EwlY
∈ − ∈  and *Y∈  if marginal resource cost of tax evasion are positive.  Finally, we show below 
that the remaining piece, the elasticity of total earned income to tax rates *Y∈ , can be well 
approximated with the adjusted elasticity of consumption to tax rates, which we can estimate from 
the available data.   
Using the worker’s budget constraint, one can find that  
0
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∂ ∂= − − + − −∂ ∂
1442443
 
where the last equality follows from the first order condition for e.  The first term in this expression 
is the marginal change in the after-tax reported income holding the reported income constant.  The 
second term is the after tax productivity response.  The last term is the marginal change in the 
penalty, ( )z t p e e∂ ∂ = ⋅ .  
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Now we can link the elasticity of the consumption response to tax rates C∈  and the elasticity 
of the earned income response to tax rates *Y∈  as follows:  
*
*
( ) (1 ) ( )
(1 )  ( )
(1 ) ( , ) ( ) (1 ) ( , ) ( )
  ( ) ,
L E
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s s
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where κ is the effective tax rate defined as the ratio of paid tax liability to household consumption, 
Ls  is the consumption share of after-tax resources a household would have if it paid taxes from the 
full amount of its true income, and Es  is the share of the gross gains from evasion ( te ) in total 
household consumption.  It follows that  
*
1( ( ) )L C EY s p e sκ−∈ = ∈ + + .    
The value of ( ) Ep e s  is negligible and can be safely omitted.  For example, if the marginal 
tax rate is 20% (our baseline case) and people evade on a quarter of their income (which seems to 
be a plausible upper bound given various estimates in the literature and the consumption to income 
ratios in our sample),  0.2 0.25 0.05Es ≈ × = .  Since the probability of being caught is typically just 
a few percent, then ( ) 0Ep e s ≈ .  
The share of net gains from tax evasion ( , ) ( )te z e t g e− −  in household consumption is even 
smaller than Es , and thus Ls  should be just slightly below 1, or 1Ls ≈ .39  It follows that * CY κ∈ ≈∈ +  
and one can use the consumption response adjusted for the effective tax rate as an approximate 
measure of the total (true) income response, or productivity response.  Importantly, the elasticity of 
                                                 
39 In general equilibrium, an entry into the tax evasion sector would eliminate abnormal profits from tax evasion.  
Likewise, regulation could respond strongly to very ‘profitable’ tax evasion activities. For example, the IRS and tax 
administrations in other countries regularly update the list of banned off-shores, accounting practices, etc.  
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consumption response is similar to Feldstein’s (1999) elasticity of the taxable income response in 
the sense that it works like a sufficient statistic absorbing adjustments along many margins.   
Now we can put all pieces together and provide lower and upper bounds on welfare losses 
due to income taxes:  
1
C C E
W e
wl t wl
κ κ∂∈ + ≤ ≤ ∈ + − ∈∂ . (10) 
This formula contains only observable quantities as we can estimate the elasticity of the tax evasion 
to taxes E∈ , the elasticity of consumption to tax changes C∈ , the effective tax rate κ, and the share 
of tax evaded income in total income using consumption and income data.  In the next subsection, 
we estimate the response of consumption to tax changes.  
7.2. Productivity Effect of Flat Tax Reform 
To contrast the response of consumption and income, we estimate consumption and income 
equations using the consistent sample and the same set of control variables (including household 
fixed effects) as in equation (3).  Given the same set of controls, this is equivalent to the estimation 
of both equations by the seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) method.  Again, our key parameter 
is the coefficient on the interaction term between the treatment group and a dummy for the post-
reform period.  As follows from the SUR properties, if we subtract the estimate of this coefficient in 
the consumption equation from the one in the income equation we should obtain exactly the 
estimate of α  in the consumption-income gap function shown in Tables 5 and 6.  Thus, we can link 
and compare the previously estimated tax evasion effect with the new estimates of the reform-
induced productivity effect. 
Table 9 reports the treatment effect estimates from the two systems of simultaneous 
equations: lnY1 and lnC1 as one system, and lnY2 and lnC2 as another one.40  Other combinations 
of income and consumption equations produce similar results and they are not reported.  The DID 
                                                 
40 The full specification of the income and consumption equations, lnY1 and lnC1, is provided in Appendix Table A3. 
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estimates provided in Table 9 indicate a large increase in reported income (18–19%) for the 
treatment group following the tax reform, but there is also a significant (although smaller) increase 
in consumption (8–9%).41  As we have explained above, the difference between income and 
consumption responses provides an estimate of the tax evasion effect, which is about 10-11% 
according to our full sample estimates (also shown in Table 6).  Given these estimates, we reach an 
immediate, important conclusion that about 55% of the increase in reported after-tax income in the 
treatment group is explained by the reduced tax evasion. 
The WDID estimates, however, are smaller for income (10–13%) and close to zero for 
consumption responses.  Thus, DID and WDID methods give similar estimates of the tax evasion 
effect but produce different results with respect to consumption gains.  We will explain below why 
there is a discrepancy between the WDID and DID estimates.  
A decrease in the marginal tax rate creates windfall consumption gains since households will 
receive more resources simply by paying lower taxes.  However, the size of these consumption 
gains is larger for the average treatment recipient (DID) than for a taxpayer who is near the 
threshold (WDID).  Using simple algebra and data on contractual earnings we can calculate the size 
of these gains.42  The average gain is 4.5% for all taxpayers experiencing a tax cut.  Thus, 
consumption could increase by 4.5% simply because reduced tax rates raise after-tax income even if 
before-tax income is fixed.  After subtracting windfall gains from the consumption response in the 
DID estimates, we obtain an average 4% response in consumption due to the productivity effect.  
Interestingly, when we augment the baseline SUR model with the differentiated response of 
taxpayers in the middle (20%) and top (30%) brackets (Table A4), the response of consumption is 
approximately 6–7% for the middle bracket and 15–16% for the top bracket (in the case of 
                                                 
41 A large increase in household income for the treatment group is consistent with Martinez-Vazquez et al. (2006) 
finding a significant growth of individual earnings among high earners after the 2001 tax reform.     
42 Specifically, we apply the pre-reform tax schedule to the post-reform contractual earnings and compute the 
counterfactual after-tax earnings.  The difference between this counterfactual measure and observed after-tax 
contractual earnings is the windfall gain.  After dividing the windfall gain by the after-tax earnings, we obtain a 
percentage windfall gain.  
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contractual earnings).  After subtracting windfall gains, which are 3.3% in the middle and 10.5% in 
the top tax brackets, the response of consumption due to increased productivity is between 2.7% and 
5.5%.43  
At the same time, the windfall gains are approximately zero for households who are close to 
the threshold of 50,000 rubles.  For example, the windfall gain for a taxpayer with 50,001 rubles is 
(50,001 50,000) 8%
50,001 0.0016%
− ⋅ ≈ .  Hence, consumption for these taxpayers can respond only to productivity 
changes.  Our WDID estimates of the consumption response have large standard errors, and we 
cannot reject the hypothesis that the productivity effect is either zero or 4%, which is in agreement 
with the DID estimates.  In our view both WDID and DID estimates convey the same message that 
the productivity effect is relatively small when compared with the evasion effect while the windfall 
gains could be the main factor behind increased consumption.  
While there are many margins of productivity adjustment to changes in tax rates, examining 
the labor supply response can help us to assess the plausibility of our estimates of the productivity 
response, especially in the short run when other margins may be less flexible.  A small productivity 
effect is consistent with a low elasticity of labor supply which is often estimated to fall between 0.1 
and 0.5 for males and between 0.4 and 1.0 for females.  If we assume that the elasticity of labor 
supply is approximately 0.3 and that there is a fixed wage rate (i.e., wage rate does not vary with 
labor supply or effort), the implied increase in earnings in the middle bracket should be 
approximately 0.3 8% 2.4%× ≈ .  This estimate is in the ball park of the estimates we obtain in the 
DID and WDID analyses.  
In summary, the response of after-tax income can be decomposed into windfall gains (4–
5%), productivity effect (0–4%), and tax evasion effect (10–11%).  Although the reform provided 
more resources to households and could have increased labor supply, the main effect was improved 
                                                 
43  Like any other survey, RLMS is likely to miss the super rich households.  However, individuals who fall into the 
30% personal income tax bracket are quite affluent by Russian standards, and thus the reader could get a sense of the 
evasion and consumption response of the rich.  
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tax compliance.  The government lost some revenue due to lower tax rates, but it gained 
substantially more revenue from enhanced reporting of income.  
7.3. Welfare Calculations 
In this subsection, we compute the deadweight loss from personal income tax in Russia and 
assess the efficiency gains from the flat rate income tax reform.  As a starting point, we first 
calculate the deadweight loss by using the elasticity of observed taxable income to the tax rate as in 
Feldstein (1999): 2 10.5 (1 ) 0.5TI TIDWL t t e t
−= − = − ∈ , where the elasticity of taxable income with 
respect to the after-tax rate (1 )t− , 1(1 )TI tTI t TIe ∂ −∂ − ×= , is re-written in terms of the elasticity of taxable 
income with respect to the tax rate t, TI tTI t TI∂∂ ×∈ = .  The last term TI∈  can be linked to the elasticity 
of after-tax income (1 ) (1 )
t wl t
Y t t wl
∂ −
∂ −×∈ =  through the following identity: 1tTI Y t−∈ =∈ + .  
According to our estimates, the elasticity of the after-tax income response to the change in 
tax rates is ( / ) ( / ) ( / ) 0.18 0.21/( 0.08) 0.47Y YY Y t t t tα∈ = ∂ × ∂ = × ∂ = × − ≈ − , where αY  is the point 
estimate of the treatment effect in the log of income function (Table 9), and the tax rate includes 1% 
contributions to the state pension fund.  Correspondingly, the elasticity of taxable income is 
1 10.473 (1 ) 0.47 0.21(1 0.21) 0.21TI t t
− −∈ = − + − = − + − ≈ − .  The equivalent elasticity of taxable 
income with respect to the after-tax rate is 0.8, which falls in the range between 0.5 and 1.33 used 
by Feldstein (1999) for the U.S.  Thus, the deadweight loss is ( 0.5) 0.21 ( 0.21) 2.2%DWL = − × × − ≈  
of total taxable income or about 20% of collected personal income tax revenue, which is 
comparable to a 32% loss in the U.S. for much higher tax rates (Feldstein 1999).  This estimate 
suggests a significant welfare loss due to the personal income tax. 44    
                                                 
44 Slemrod (1994) and Slemrod and Kopczuk (2002) argue that elasticities estimated on variation due to tax reforms 
may suffer from the Lucas critique because of simultaneous changes in many dimensions.  As a result, estimated 
elasticities may not have structural interpretation.  However, our RD-type estimates are less likely to be contaminated 
with other elements of the tax reform because taxpayers around the threshold tend to be similar along all dimensions but 
income, and hence, at the margin, sources of variation other than the tax rate are not likely to be quantitatively 
important.  The similarity of WDID and DID estimates indicates that the estimated elasticity of the tax evasion and 
productivity responses can be reasonably expected to closely approximate the structural elasticity of these responses to 
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This estimate, however, does not take into account tax evasion and therefore could overstate 
the social cost of taxes.  We use our theoretical results from Section 7.1 to correct the estimate of 
welfare losses in the presence of tax evasion.  From our empirical analysis, we know the elasticity 
of consumption response, which is ( / ) 0.08 0.21/( 0.08) 0.21C C t tα∈ = × ∂ = × − ≈ − , and the elasticity 
of tax evasion response, which is ( / ) 0.10 0.21/( 0.08) 0.26E e t tα∈ = × ∂ = − × − ≈ .  Equation (10) also 
requires the effective tax rate κ that is estimated in the range from 0.14 to 0.17 using alternative 
definitions of income and consumption in our data.   
Given that the share of concealed income in total income is a quarter or less (see Section 
7.1), we can provide an upper bound (in absolute terms) on the tax-evasion-corrected elasticity of 
welfare with respect to tax changes 0.21 0.14 0.25 0.26 0.135eC Ewlκ∈ + − ∈ = − + − × = −  and an upper 
bound on the deadweight loss *0.5 ( ) 1.4%eC Y EwlDWL t= − ∈ − ∈ =  of total earned income or 14.6% 
of collected personal income taxes.  This is substantial, yet it is only about two thirds of the loss 
implied by the reported income elasticity.  Using more conservative estimates of κ=0.17 and 
e
wl <0.25 will give us even smaller estimates of the deadweight loss.  
Clearly, the traditional approach of using the elasticity of reported taxable income in welfare 
calculations can significantly overstate the real welfare gains from the tax reform in the presence of 
tax evasion.  As we see from the Russian experience, tax evasion can make a tangible difference in 
welfare calculations.  We find that the deadweight loss due to the personal income tax can be at 
least 30% smaller when adjusted for tax evasion.  Consequently, the burden of personal income tax 
and the welfare gains from reducing taxes are considerable, yet smaller than thought before.45  
                                                                                                                                                                  
changes in tax rates.  In further support of this assertion, we note that elasticities are similar for taxpayers in the 21% 
and 31% brackets, which is an unlikely outcome if other elements of the tax reform had large effects on our estimated 
elasticities.  
45 The reform can have other benefits.  For example, most developing and transitional countries badly need additional 
tax revenues.  Increasing tax rates on those who are not evading will create excess burden losses.  Getting these 
additional revenues from evaders is more equitable and less distortionary. 
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8. Conclusions 
The 2001 Russian flat rate income tax reform has often been heralded as a success story and 
has been credited with large increases in tax revenues and an improved business climate.  Although 
it has been difficult to differentiate between myth and reality with the Russian experience, many 
other transitional countries have followed suit with flat rate income tax reforms, and an increasing 
number of countries around the world are considering the adoption of a flat rate income tax.  In this 
paper we focus on the impact of the flat income tax rate on tax evasion, an issue that was, and 
continues to be, a major problem in Russia as well as in many other transition and developing 
countries.  We argue that the flat tax reform was instrumental in decreasing tax evasion and that, to 
a certain extent, greater fiscal revenues for Russia in 2001 and several years beyond can be linked to 
increased voluntary tax compliance and reporting.  
Since tax evasion is not directly observable when integral audit programs are lacking, we 
use indirect techniques to measure the dynamics of tax evasion.  Specifically, we use consumption-
income data and economic theory to estimate the effect of the tax reform on tax evasion.  The core 
theoretical argument is that under the permanent income hypothesis consumption should be equal to 
permanent income.  Assuming that consumption expenditures are fully reported, the discrepancy 
between the log of consumption and the log of income, which we call the consumption-income gap, 
indicates that households receive unreported income.   
With the goal of separating the tax evasion effect of flat rate income tax reform from other 
factors, we use the difference-in-difference approach and regression-discontinuity-type analysis in 
various specifications.  Regardless of the alternative variable definitions and methods used, we find 
that ceteris paribus the consumption-income gap decreased by about 9 to 12 percent more for 
households that experienced a reduction in marginal tax rates.  That is, the most significant 
reduction in tax evasion was for taxpayers that experienced the largest decrease in tax rates after the 
flat rate income tax was introduced.  We also find that this decline in tax evasion was likely due to 
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changes in voluntary compliance as opposed to greater enforcement effort by the tax administration 
authorities.  
In addition, in the paper we also analyze the productivity effect of the tax reform and find it 
to be relatively small by comparison to the tax evasion effect.  Specifically, the productivity effect, 
measured by the relative increase in consumption for households that faced smaller tax rates after 
the reform, is zero at the threshold and about 4 percent for the treatment group over the four-year 
period.  Obviously, this estimate is based on a relatively short sample of four years, and the long run 
response could be larger.  
These results in the paper have several important policy implications.  The adoption of a flat 
rate income tax is not expected to lead to significant increases in the tax revenues because the 
productivity response is shown to be fairly small.  However, if the economy is plagued by 
ubiquitous tax evasion, as was the case in Russia, then flat rate income tax reform can lead to 
substantial revenue gains via increases in voluntary compliance.  At the same time, given the 
argument in Chetty (2008), a strong evasion response suggests that the efficiency gain from the 
Russian tax reform perhaps is smaller than thought before.  Using observable responses of 
consumption and income to tax changes, we find that the tax-evasion-adjusted deadweight loss from 
personal income tax is at least 30% smaller than the loss implied from the standard method based on 
the response of reported income to tax changes.  Thus, although we find tangible efficiency gains 
from the tax reform, they are not as large as implied by conventional approaches.  
The paper also offers several contributions to the public finance literature.  First, we provide 
strong evidence of a positive relationship between (lower) tax rates and (lower) tax evasion.  Until 
now, cross-section studies in the tax evasion literature had provided ambiguous results.  Second, the 
paper offers a replicable empirical methodology for the estimation of tax evasion and changes in 
productivity in response to tax reform in other countries provided there are a longitudinal household 
budget survey and significant changes in the tax structure.  Third, we develop a feasible framework 
 41
to assess the deadweight loss from personal income tax in the presence of tax evasion based on the 
consumption response to tax changes.  Since this framework uses only observable data, it can be 
widely implemented. 
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Table 1: Russian Economy Before and After the Tax Reform 
 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Nominal GDP, bln. 1585.0 2200.2 2585.9 2741 4767 7302 9041 10830.5 13243.2 16966.4 21598.0
real growth, % -4.1 -3.5 0.8 -4.9 5.4 9.0 5.0 4.7 7.3 7.2 6.4
Annual CPI, end year 232.2 121.8 111.0 184.4 136.5 120.2 118.6 115.1 112.0 111.7 110.9
Budget deficit (-), bln. -49.1 -94.2 -127.9 -155 -44 138 265 97 174 760 1759
Nominal tax revenues, bln. 353.3 464.3 593.4 524.8 891.4 1481.9 1955.8 2331.0 2671.9 3299.6 4627.2
real growth, % … -9.9 11.1 -25.4 -1.5 20.7 13.3 3.0 0.6 4.7 15.7
Nominal tax revenues 
from PIT, bln. 36.7 56.7 75.6 72.2 117.1 174.3 255.5 357.8 455.3 574.2 706.6
real growth, % … 6.0 15.9 -19.4 -5.9 8.1 25.8 21.1 11.7 6.9 1.6
% of tax revenues 10.4 12.2 12.7 13.8 13.1 11.8 13.1 15.3 17.0 17.4 15.3
Top marginal PIT rate 30 35 35 35 45 30 13 13 13 13 13
 
Sources:  Goskomstat (2004), Goskomstat (2006), Federal Tax Department website (www.nalog.ru). 
Notes: All tax revenues are for the consolidated budget and exclude non-budgetary funds.  Real growth of GDP and tax revenues is calculated using a GDP 
deflator.  
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Table 2: Tax Evasion Function, FE 
 
 lnC1-lnY1 lnC2-lnY1 lnC1-lnY2 lnC2-lnY2 
Panel A 
N of HH members -0.010 -0.033** 0.018 -0.005 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
N of senior HH members, 60+ -0.210*** -0.200*** -0.180*** -0.169*** 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
N of children in HH, 18- 0.088*** 0.076*** 0.034 0.023 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) 
Year = 1998 -0.026 -0.025 -0.026 -0.025 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
Year = 2001 -0.142*** -0.139*** -0.140*** -0.137*** 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) 
Year = 2002 -0.221*** -0.213*** -0.216*** -0.208*** 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
Year = 2003 -0.208*** -0.203*** -0.217*** -0.213*** 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
Year = 2004 -0.268*** -0.262*** -0.265*** -0.260*** 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
HH head characteristics     
Age -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.002** -0.001* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Years of schooling -0.006 -0.004 -0.007* -0.005 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Married -0.093*** -0.087*** -0.060** -0.053** 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.023) (0.023) 
Currently works -0.298*** -0.278*** -0.151*** -0.130** 
 (0.055) (0.054) (0.052) (0.052) 
Years of tenure 0.003** 0.003*** 0.002* 0.002** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Works at enterprise -0.076* -0.083* -0.081* -0.089** 
 (0.046) (0.045) (0.044) (0.044) 
Works in private sector -0.105*** -0.105*** -0.085*** -0.084*** 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
Log (firm size) -0.020*** -0.019*** -0.016*** -0.015*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
N observations (households) 24129 (6135) 24129 (6135) 24723 (6202) 24723 (6202) 
R2 overall 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.03 
Panel B 
After reform trend (2001=1) -0.067*** -0.066*** -0.066*** -0.065*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
 
Notes:  We report Arellano (1987) robust standard errors in parentheses to control for arbitrary serial correlation; * 
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  Omitted categories are the year 2000 and the state sector.  
All specifications are estimated on the full sample with household fixed effects (FE).  HH denotes household.  Household 
head is the person with the largest income. The dependent variable - consumption-income gap - is defined in the text.  
Besides the after-reform trend, the model estimated in Panel B includes the same set of covariates as in Panel A.  Two 
dummy variables for missing sector and firm size are included but not shown here.  C1=expenditures on non-durable 
goods, C2=C1+transfers, Y1=regular income, and Y2=Y1+irregular payments. The number of observations in 
specifications with lnY2 is greater than that with lnY1 because the former specifications include the households reporting 
irregular payments as the only source of their income. 
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Table 3: Consumption-Income Gap and Attitudes toward Taxes, 1998 and 2002 
 
 lnC1-lnY1 lnC2-lnY1 lnC1-lnY2 lnC2-lnY2 
Perception of tax payments 0.266*** 0.254** 0.359*** 0.348*** 
(at the district level) (0.102) (0.102) (0.102) (0.102) 
Year = 2002 -0.172*** -0.161*** -0.170*** -0.160*** 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
N observations  7539 7539 7806 7806 
R2 0.09 0.07 0.05 0.04 
 
Notes:  We report Arellano (1987) robust standard errors in parentheses to control for arbitrary serial correlation; * 
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  Household head is the person with the largest income.  
The dependent variable - consumption-income gap - is defined in the text.  Perception of tax payments is a district-level 
measure for the share of individuals who believe that most people don’t pay taxes or pay taxes on less than half of their 
income.  Besides perception of tax payments, the model includes the same set of covariates as in Table 2.  
C1=expenditures on non-durable goods, C2=C1+transfers, Y1=regular income, and Y2=Y1+irregular payments.  
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Table 4: Tax Enforcement in Russia Before and After the Tax Reform 
 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Tax Audits 
Accrued tax revenues from tax audits and 
sanctions, bln. Rubles 
189c
 
283 274 220.6 261 
Of which received, bln. rubles 
 
30.5 41.6 59.7 68.7 NA 
Number of on-site audits, thousands 
 
796 
 
690 605 468.2 331.9 
Number of on-site audits of individual 
entrepreneurs, thousands 
759c  
 
664 415 222.9 124.1 
Accrued tax revenues from on-site audits, 
bln rubles 
49.7 75 68.4 NA 47.7 
of which received, bln rubles 
 
20.3 21 17.8 NA NA 
Charges for Tax Law Violations 
Administrative charges against enterprise 
managers, thousands people 
329 350 312 186 NA 
Administrative charges against individual 
entrepreneurs, thousands people 
480 510 289 96 NA 
Total amount of charges, millions rubles 
 
195 247 255 150 NA 
Number of blocked bank accounts, 
thousands 
172 256 344 408 NA 
Number of cases sent to the tax police for 
further investigation, thousands 
NA 14.4 17 13.4 9.5 
Of which number of criminal cases opened, 
thousands 
1.3 3.2 4 2.6 1.1 
 
Source:  Federal Tax Department archive (www.nalog.ru); c – calculated from percentage changes reported in 2000.
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Table 5: Tax Evasion Function: Difference-in-Difference Approach, FE 
 
 lnC1-lnY1 lnC2-lnY1 lnC1-lnY2 lnC2-lnY2 
N of HH members -0.016 -0.037*** 0.014 -0.007 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
N of senior HH members, 60+ -0.181*** -0.173*** -0.159*** -0.152*** 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.026) (0.026) 
N of children in HH, 18- 0.087*** 0.077*** 0.034 0.024 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
Year = 1998 -0.020 -0.016 -0.028 -0.025 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
Year = 2002 -0.073*** -0.068*** -0.072*** -0.066*** 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.019) 
Year = 2003 -0.076*** -0.073*** -0.080*** -0.077*** 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) 
Year = 2004 -0.136*** -0.129*** -0.128*** -0.120*** 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.020) (0.020) 
HH head characteristics     
Age -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.002** -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Years of schooling -0.007 -0.006 -0.010** -0.009* 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Married -0.070*** -0.071*** -0.031 -0.030 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.026) (0.026) 
Currently works -0.293*** -0.277*** -0.158*** -0.142*** 
 (0.055) (0.055) (0.052) (0.051) 
Years of tenure 0.002* 0.002* 0.001 0.002 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Works at enterprise -0.083* -0.084* -0.081* -0.083* 
 (0.046) (0.046) (0.043) (0.043) 
Works in private sector -0.100*** -0.099*** -0.085*** -0.083*** 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
Log (firm size) -0.019*** -0.018*** -0.014** -0.013** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
After reform dummy (Dp) -0.103*** -0.104*** -0.106*** -0.107*** 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) 
dtreat × Dp -0.109*** -0.108*** -0.105*** -0.102*** 
 (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) 
N observations (households) 17081 (4174) 17081 (4174) 17444 (4184) 17444 (4184) 
R2 overall 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.04 
 
Notes:  We report Arellano (1987) robust standard errors in parentheses to control for arbitrary serial correlation; * 
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  Omitted categories are the state sector and years 2000 and 
2001.  All specifications are estimated on the full sample with household fixed effects (FE).  HH denotes household.  
Household head is the person with the largest income.  The dependent variable - consumption-income gap - is defined in 
the text.  Treatment and control groups are defined on the basis of post-reform unadjusted for inflation earnings received in 
the last month.  The sample includes households whose head is a wage earner (in contrast to Table 2 that is based on the 
full sample).  Two dummy variables for missing sector and firm size are included but not shown here.  C1=expenditures on 
non-durable goods, C2=C1+transfers, Y1=regular income, and Y2=Y1+irregular payments. 
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 Table 6: Treatment Effect in the Difference-in-Difference Approach 
 
Alternative Specifications lnC1-lnY1 lnC2-lnY1 lnC1-lnY2 lnC2-lnY2 
Panel A. Upper brackets × after reform dummy (Dp = 1 if 2001-2004) 
Contractual earnings     
Full sample -0.095*** -0.091*** -0.101*** -0.096*** 
 (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) 
 [17287] [17287] [17684] [17684] 
Restricted sample in current prices -0.117*** -0.109*** -0.120*** -0.112*** 
 (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) 
 [14812] [14812] [15123] [15123] 
Restricted sample in fixed prices -0.111*** -0.117*** -0.099*** -0.104*** 
 (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) 
 [14166] [14166] [14455] [14455] 
Restricted sample with  -0.122*** -0.109*** -0.118*** -0.107*** 
district × year interactions (0.035) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) 
 [14812] [14812] [15123] [15123] 
Restricted sample using the 4-year  -0.131*** -0.128*** -0.145*** -0.142*** 
average of contractual earnings (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) 
 [14812] [14812] [15123] [15123] 
Restricted sample without -0.116*** -0.109*** -0.123*** -0.117*** 
households with potentially large  (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) 
deductions  [13322] [13322] [13615] [13615] 
Restricted sample without -0.123*** -0.115*** -0.136*** -0.129*** 
households with purchases of  (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) 
declared durables [14522] [14522] [14826] [14826] 
Panel B. Upper brackets × after reform time trend (tp = 1 if 2001) 
Contractual earnings     
Full sample -0.033*** -0.031*** -0.034*** -0.032*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Restricted sample in current prices -0.037*** -0.033*** -0.040*** -0.036*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) 
Earnings received last month     
Full sample -0.038*** -0.036*** -0.034*** -0.032*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Restricted sample in current prices -0.036*** -0.034*** -0.039*** -0.037*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
 
Notes:  Robust standard errors are in parentheses and the number of observations is in brackets; * significant at 10%; 
** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  We use Arellano (1987) robust standard errors to correct for arbitrary 
serial correlation.  The dependent variable - consumption-income gap - is defined in the text.  Reported are the 
estimated coefficients on the interaction term between the treatment group (upper brackets) and a post-reform dummy 
(or trend in Panel B) using different measures of earnings and samples.  All specifications are estimated with 
household fixed effects and include the same set of variables as in equation (3) and Table 5.  The number of 
observations in panels B is the same as in Panel A.  C1=expenditures on non-durable goods, C2=C1+transfers, 
Y1=regular income, and Y2=Y1+irregular payments. Households with potentially large deductions are defined as 
households with recent (2001-2004) purchases of real estate (apartments, houses, dachas, and land) or with 
expenditures on education in excess of 200 rubles per month, which when annualized amounts to about 10% of 
maximum deduction for educational expenditures.  Households with purchases of declared durables are those that 
purchased real estate, vehicles, and stocks that title organizations are required to report to tax authorities after January 
1, 2000.  Restricted sample includes only households with household head’s gross income between 20,000 and 
100,000 rubles per year.  For incomes in this range, employers pay the same social tax and employees are not eligible 
for standard deductions. 
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Table 7: Treatment Effect in the Difference-in-Difference Approach: Heterogeneous Response 
 
Alternative Specifications lnC1-lnY1 lnC2-lnY1 lnC1-lnY2 lnC2-lnY2 
     
State vs. public sector     
dtreat × Dp (State sector is omitted) 0.001 -0.017 -0.014 -0.030 
 (0.054) (0.054) (0.052) (0.052) 
dtreat × Dp × Private -0.229*** -0.192** -0.236*** -0.201** 
 (0.080) (0.080) (0.079) (0.079) 
N observations 17287 17287 17684 17684 
     
Blue collar vs. White collar     
dtreat × Dp × Private -0.111 -0.073 -0.133 -0.097 
(Blue collar workers are omitted) (0.103) (0.103) (0.099) (0.099) 
dtreat × Dp × Private × White collar -0.302** -0.308** -0.295** -0.297** 
 (0.123) (0.125) (0.124) (0.124) 
N observations 17287 17287 17684 17684 
 
Notes:  We report Arellano (1987) robust standard errors in parentheses to control for arbitrary serial correlation; * 
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  The dependent variable - consumption-income gap - is 
defined in the text.  Reported are the estimated coefficients on the interaction term between the treatment group (upper 
brackets) and a post-reform dummy using different measures of earnings.  Treatment and control group are defined on 
the basis of post-reform contractual earnings.  All specifications are estimated with household fixed effects and include 
the same set of variables as in equation (3) and Table 4.  C1=expenditures on non-durable goods, C2=C1+transfers, 
Y1=regular income, and Y2=Y1+irregular payments. 
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Table 8: Treatment Effect in the Weighted Difference-in-Difference Approach 
 
Alternative specifications lnC1-lnY1 lnC2-lnY1 lnC1-lnY2 lnC2-lnY2 
Earnings received last month -0.120** -0.120** -0.123*** -0.123** 
 (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) 
N observations (weighted) 16909 16909 17261 17261 
R2 overall 0.11 0.11 0.09 0.08 
     
Contractual earnings -0.098** -0.095** -0.109** -0.108** 
 (0.048) (0.048) (0.047) (0.046) 
N observations (weighted) 17180 17180 17571 17571 
R2 overall 0.11 0.10 0.08 0.07 
 
Notes:  We report Arellano (1987) robust standard errors in parentheses to correct for arbitrary serial correlation; * 
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  The dependent variable - consumption-income gap - 
is defined in the text.  Reported are the estimated coefficients on the interaction term between the treatment group 
(upper brackets) and a post-reform dummy.  All specifications are estimated by weighted least squares with 
household fixed effects, and include the same set of variables as in equation (3) and Table 4.  The WDID approach 
produces the same estimates for both full and restricted samples because observations beyond the restricted sample 
have zero weights.  C1=expenditures on non-durable goods, C2=C1+transfers, Y1=regular income, and 
Y2=Y1+irregular payments. 
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Table 9: Tax Evasion vs. Productivity Effects 
 
Alternative specifications lnY1 lnC1 lnY2 lnC2 
Difference-in-difference 
Earnings received last month 0.189*** 0.080*** 0.188*** 0.087*** 
 (0.029) (0.024) (0.030) (0.024) 
N observations  17081 17081 17444 17444 
R2 overall 0.23 0.18 0.21 0.17 
     
Contractual earnings 0.175*** 0.080*** 0.184*** 0.088*** 
 (0.028) (0.023) (0.029) (0.023) 
N observations  17287 17287 17684 17684 
R2 overall 0.22 0.18 0.21 0.17 
Weighted difference-in-difference 
Earnings received last month 0.101*** -0.019 0.106** -0.017 
 (0.045) (0.036) (0.044) (0.035) 
N observations  16909 16909 17261 17261 
R2 overall 0.25 0.20 0.24 0.19 
     
Contractual earnings 0.117*** 0.018 0.130*** 0.022 
 (0.041) (0.037) (0.043) (0.037) 
N observations  17180 17180 17571 17571 
R2 overall 0.26 0.21 0.25 0.20 
 
Notes:  We report Arellano (1987) robust standard errors in parentheses to correct for arbitrary serial correlation; * 
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  Reported are the estimated coefficients on the 
interaction term between the treatment group (upper brackets) and a post-reform dummy.  All specifications are 
estimated on the full sample with household fixed effects and include the same set of variables as in equation (3) and 
Table 4.  C1=expenditures on non-durable goods, C2=C1+transfers, Y1=regular income, and Y2=Y1+irregular 
payments.  The estimates are obtained from the two systems of simultaneous equations: a) lnY1 and lnC1 and b) 
lnY2 and lnC2. 
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Figure 1:  Comparison of RLMS with Official Statistics 
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Notes:  The RLMS measure of household disposable income per capita is after taxes and transfers given, 
and it excludes in-kind consumption, such as owner-occupied housing and home-grown food.  The matching 
NIPA measure is disposable income for the “household account” after taxes and transfers minus in-kind 
consumption (Goskomstat 2007a).  Both RLMS and NIPA measures of consumption per capita include 
expenditures on durables but exclude imputed in-kind expenditures (Goskomstat 2007a).  All RLMS 
measures are deflated using monthly CPI and the date of interview.  All NIPA measures are deflated using 
annual average CPI.  RLMS income and consumption for 1997 are imputed using the lagged RLMS value 
multiplied by the 1997 growth rate from NIPA.  The 1998 discrepancy in Panel B can be explained by the 
fact that RLMS has been conducted right after the August financial crisis while NIPA’s numbers are 
averaged over the year.  Official numbers of saving rate are obtained from the Household Budget Survey 
(Goskomstat 2007b).  
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Figure 2: Consumption-Income Gap Dynamics for Treatment and Control Groups 
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Notes:  The figure shows annual means of the consumption-income gap for treatment and control groups after 
controlling for observable characteristics and household fixed effects.  Treatment and control group are defined on 
the basis of post-reform contractual earnings.   
 56
Figure 3: Income Distribution Below and Above the Threshold 
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Notes:  The histograms display income distribution before and after the 2001 flat tax reform.  The vertical line 
indicates the threshold in the personal income tax.  Before the reform (2000), individuals to the left of the line paid 
12% personal income tax rate and 1% pension fund contributions. Individuals to the right of the line paid 20% (or 
30% for higher incomes) personal income tax rate and 1% pension fund contributions. 
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Table A1: Summary Statistics 
 
 All 
Treatment 
Group 
Control 
Group 
C1 6462 7608 4331 
 (5995) (6675) (3592) 
C2 6922 8135 4667 
 (6743) (7453) (4348) 
C3 7816 9393 4884 
 (11566) (13420) (5863) 
C4 5768 6767 3909 
 (12939) (15336) (6003) 
Y1 6442 7880 3767 
 (7134) (7017) (6555) 
Y2 7317 8822 4517 
 (12392) (13005) (10610) 
Y3 6573 7973 3969 
 (7242) (7184) (6600) 
N of HH members 3.089 3.184 2.911 
 (1.322) (1.286) (1.370) 
N of senior HH members, 60+ 0.329 0.288 0.406 
 (0.609) (0.575) (0.661) 
N of children in HH, 18- 0.829 0.864 0.765 
 (0.862) (0.845) (0.889) 
Age 42.229 40.622 45.219 
 (14.084) (12.981) (15.498) 
Years of schooling 11.869 12.234 11.190 
 (2.632) (2.465) (2.793) 
Married 0.583 0.618 0.518 
 (0.493) (0.486) (0.500) 
Currently works 0.833 0.884 0.740 
 (0.373) (0.321) (0.439) 
N1 17046 5959 11087 
    
Years of tenure 8.080 7.639 9.062 
 (9.376) (9.006) (10.082) 
Works at enterprise 0.930 0.927 0.938 
 (0.255) (0.260) (0.241) 
Works in state sector 0.439 0.390 0.548 
 (0.496) (0.488) (0.498) 
Works in private sector 0.449 0.502 0.331 
 (0.497) (0.500) (0.470) 
Log (firm size) 3.357 3.473 3.098 
 (2.749) (2.826) (2.552) 
N2 14203 4407 9796 
 
Notes: All income and consumption measures are in December 2002 rubles.  HH denotes household.  Household 
head is the person with largest earnings.  N1 includes the same households as in column 1 of Table 4 whose head 
was employed at least once after the reform.  N2 includes only those households whose head is currently employed 
in any given year.  C1=expenditures on non-durable goods, C2=C1+transfers, C3=C1+purchases of durables, 
C4=C1+net savings, Y1=regular income, Y2=Y1+irregular payments, and Y3=Y1+income from selling home 
grown goods.  Treatment and control groups are defined on the basis of post-reform contractual earnings.
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Table A2: Tax Evasion Function with Alternative Measures of Income and Expenditures: 
Difference-in-Difference Approach, FE 
 
 lnC3-lnY1 with lnC4-lnY1 with lnC1-lnY3 with 
 Purchases of Durables Net Savings Home Production 
N of HH members -0.002 -0.028* -0.019 
 (0.015) (0.016) (0.014) 
N of senior HH members, 60+ -0.212*** -0.149*** -0.170*** 
 (0.028) (0.029) (0.026) 
N of children in HH, 18- 0.081*** 0.083*** 0.088*** 
 (0.023) (0.025) (0.022) 
Year = 1998 -0.044* -0.033 -0.003 
 (0.026) (0.027) (0.025) 
Year = 2002 -0.058*** -0.060*** -0.073*** 
 (0.021) (0.022) (0.020) 
Year = 2003 -0.051** -0.040* -0.084*** 
 (0.021) (0.022) (0.020) 
Year = 2004 -0.107*** -0.106*** -0.135*** 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.020) 
HH head characteristics    
Age -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Years of schooling -0.005 -0.010* -0.006 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Married -0.067** -0.038 -0.067*** 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.026) 
Currently works -0.297*** -0.277*** -0.265*** 
 (0.058) (0.060) (0.054) 
Years of tenure 0.003** 0.002 0.002 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Works at enterprise -0.076 -0.048 -0.084* 
 (0.048) (0.049) (0.045) 
Works in private sector -0.093*** -0.068*** -0.099*** 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.021) 
Log (firm size) -0.021*** -0.021*** -0.017*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
After reform dummy (Dp) -0.110*** -0.098*** -0.085*** 
 (0.032) (0.033) (0.030) 
Upper brackets × Dp -0.091*** -0.105*** -0.114*** 
 (0.034) (0.035) (0.032) 
N observations (households) 17059 (4174) 16373 (4152) 17081 (4174) 
R2 overall 0.04 0.04 0.05 
 
Notes:  We report Arellano (1987) robust standard errors in parentheses to correct for arbitrary serial correlation; * 
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  Omitted categories are the state sector and years 2000 and 
2001.  All specifications are estimated on the full sample with household fixed effects (FE).  HH denotes household.  
Household head is the person with the largest income.  The dependent variable - consumption-income gap - is defined in the 
text.  Treatment and control groups are defined on the basis of post-reform unadjusted for inflation monthly earnings received 
in the last month.  The sample includes households whose head is a wage earner (in contrast to Table 2 that is based on the 
full sample).  Two dummy variables for missing sector and firm size are included but not shown here.  C1=expenditures on 
non-durable goods, C3=C1+purchases of durables, C4=C1+net savings, Y1=regular income, and Y3=Y1+income from 
selling home grown goods.   
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Table A3: Tax Evasion vs. Productivity Effects, Full Specification 
 
 Difference-in-Difference Weighted  Difference-in-Difference 
 lnY1 lnC1 lnY1 lnC1 
N of HH members 0.214*** 0.198*** 0.242*** 0.204*** 
 (0.013) (0.011) (0.017) (0.015) 
N of senior HH members, 60+ 0.069*** -0.110*** 0.045* -0.121*** 
 (0.024) (0.020) (0.028) (0.029) 
N of children in HH, 18- -0.140*** -0.047*** -0.174*** -0.062*** 
 (0.022) (0.016) (0.027) (0.021) 
Year = 1998 -0.224*** -0.245*** -0.238*** -0.292*** 
 (0.023) (0.017) (0.030) (0.025) 
Year = 2001 0.154*** 0.077*** 0.130*** 0.100*** 
 (0.018) (0.013) (0.024) (0.017) 
Year = 2002 0.239*** 0.159*** 0.223*** 0.167*** 
 (0.019) (0.013) (0.024) (0.018) 
Year = 2003 0.344*** 0.203*** 0.317*** 0.217*** 
 (0.019) (0.013) (0.024) (0.018) 
HH head characteristics     
Age 0.002** -0.002*** 0.003** -0.002** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Years of schooling 0.009** 0.002 0.009 0.005 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) 
Married 0.182*** 0.105*** 0.158*** 0.116*** 
 (0.024) (0.019) (0.034) (0.028) 
Currently works 0.434*** 0.144*** 0.447*** 0.195*** 
 (0.049) (0.035) (0.070) (0.052) 
Years of tenure -0.002** -0.000 -0.002 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Works at enterprise 0.054 -0.031 0.115** -0.021 
 (0.041) (0.030) (0.058) (0.043) 
Works in private sector 0.150*** 0.055*** 0.137*** 0.028 
 (0.021) (0.015) (0.027) (0.020) 
Log (firm size) 0.026*** 0.007* 0.023*** 0.010* 
 (0.006) (0.004) (0.007) (0.006) 
After reform dummy (Dp) 0.153*** 0.041** 0.172*** 0.041 
 (0.026) (0.020) (0.039) (0.033) 
Upper brackets*Dp 0.175*** 0.080*** 0.117*** 0.018 
 (0.028) (0.023) (0.041) (0.037) 
N observations (households) 17287 17287 17180 17180 
R2 overall 0.22 0.18 0.26 0.21 
 
Notes:  We report Arellano (1987) robust standard errors in parentheses to correct for arbitrary serial correlation; * 
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  Omitted categories are the state sector and years 
2000 and 2001.  All specifications are estimated on the full sample with household fixed effects.  C1=expenditures 
on non-durable goods, C2=C1+transfers, Y1=regular income, and Y2=Y1+irregular payments.  The estimates are 
obtained from the system of two simultaneous equations lnY1 and lnC1.  Two dummy variables for missing sector 
and firm size are included but not shown here.  Treatment and control groups are defined on the basis of post-reform 
contractual earnings. 
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Table A4: Tax Evasion vs. Productivity Effects 
 
Alternative specifications lnY1 lnC1 lnY2 lnC2 
Earnings received last month 
Upper brackets × Dp 0.139*** 0.052** 0.136*** 0.059** 
 (0.030) (0.025) (0.031) (0.025) 
31% top bracket × Dp 0.212*** 0.120*** 0.225*** 0.119*** 
 (0.041) (0.032) (0.041) (0.033) 
N observations  17081 17081 17444 17444 
R2 overall 0.23 0.18 0.21 0.17 
Contractual earnings 
Upper brackets × Dp 0.141*** 0.063*** 0.145*** 0.070*** 
 (0.029) (0.024) (0.030) (0.024) 
31% top bracket × Dp 0.182*** 0.091** 0.207*** 0.093** 
 (0.046) (0.036) (0.046) (0.037) 
N observations  17287 17287 17684 17684 
R2 overall 0.23 0.18 0.21 0.17 
 
Notes:  We report Arellano (1987) robust standard errors in parentheses to correct for arbitrary serial correlation; * 
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  Reported are the estimated coefficients on the 
interaction of a post-reform dummy with the two upper brackets and the 31% top bracket.  All specifications are 
estimated on the full sample with household fixed effects and include the same set of variables as in equation (3) and 
Table 4.  C1=expenditures on non-durable goods, C2=C1+transfers, Y1=regular income, and Y2=Y1+irregular 
payments.  The estimates are obtained from the two systems of simultaneous equations: a) lnY1 and lnC1 and b) 
lnY2 and lnC2. 
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Appendix 1: Components of the Russia’s 2001 Personal Income Tax Reform 
 
Main Components of the Reform Implications for Estimation 
The reform introduced a flat PIT rate of 13 percent; it eliminated the existing 
progressive rate schedule (with rates of 12 percent up to 50,000 rubles of annual 
income, 20 percent for 50,001-150,000 rubles, and 30 percent above 150,000 
rubles), and 1 percent individual contributions to the pension fund. 
The design of the reforms allows us to identify the treatment and control groups 
by applying the pre-reform threshold to post-reform income and implement both 
DID and WDID methods in estimating the behavioral response to policy change. 
The number of deductions was reduced, and the standard deduction was 
established in the amount of 400 rubles per month for annual income below 
20,000 rubles.  
The WDID estimates around the 50,000 rubles threshold are not affected by 
deductions.  The DID estimates are conducted on the restricted sample that 
excludes individuals with income below 20,000 rubles. 
All employer contributions to the social security funds (pensions, social insurance 
and medical insurance) were unified into a social tax.  The reform eliminated the 
contribution to the employment fund and cut the existing flat rate from 38.5 
percent, when all contributions were added together, to a regressive scale of 20 
percent for annual worker payroll in excess of 100,000 rubles but less than 
300,000 rubles; 10 percent of amounts in excess of 300,000 rubles but less than 
600,000 rubles; and 5 percent for amounts in excess of 600,000 rubles. The 5 
percent rate was cut to 2 percent on January 1, 2002.  
The WDID estimates around the 50,000 rubles threshold are not affected by the 
unified social tax.  The DID estimates are performed on the restricted sample of 
workers that are subject to the same social tax rate, with annual income between 
20,000 rubles and 100,000 rubles. 
Effective January 1, 2001, the tax code introduced 35 percent tax on income from 
lotteries, prizes, gambling, large voluntary insurance contributions and excessive 
interest payments and 30 percent tax on dividends (that is made subject to 
withholding).  The tax on dividends was cut to 6 percent on January 1, 2002. 
Households in our sample do not hold significant financial assets.  The average 
share of capital income and insurance payments in disposable income is 0.6%.   
The DID and WDID estimates are not sensitive to excluding households with 
capital income and insurance payments. 
The reform allowed deductions of charitable contributions up to 25 percent of 
income; deductions of medical expenses up to 25,000 rubles; deductions of 
education expenses up to 25,000 rubles; one-time housing deductions for the 
purchase or construction of a home excluding interest paid on mortgage loans up 
to 600,000 rubles; and one-time property deductions for the sale of real estate or 
land plots in the amount that depends on the duration of ownership and the type of 
the property.   
Although the number of tax declarations with requested deductions increased 
rapidly from 821 thousands in 2002 to 1.3 millions in 2004, it is less than 2 
percent of individual taxpayers (from Federal Tax Department archive).  More 
than 85% of all requested deductions in 2002-2004 were for housing purchases 
and education expenses.  The DID and WDID estimates are not sensitive to 
excluding households with recent purchases of real estate and education 
expenses.   
Other Important Changes around the Reform Time Implications for Estimation 
Part 1 of Tax Code was made effective January 1, 1999.  Part 1 replaced the 
draconian punishment structure by more reasonable penalties for tax-related 
violations and provided a legal basis for the use of taxpayer identification number 
but it also limited the enforcement power of the tax authorities. 
Various measures of tax enforcement in Table 4 do not indicate significant 
improvements in the work of tax administration over the sample period.  To the 
extent that the level of tax enforcement efforts is region-specific, we include 
dummies for 38 local districts (counties) and their interaction with year dummies 
in the DID specification.  The WDID method accounts for changes in tax 
enforcement by comparing households just below and just above the threshold, 
with a similar probability of audit.  As a robustness check, we exclude 
households with recent purchases of real estate, vehicles, and stocks. 
Effective January 1, 2000, title organizations are required to report to tax 
authorities the amount individuals spent on purchase of real estate, vehicles, gold, 
stocks, and valuable art.  
In December of 2001 the Government approved the Tax Administration 
Development Program for 2002-2004.  This program included provisions to 
reform the structure of the tax administration and to develop integrated 
information systems, among other measures. 
 
